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ABSTRACT

Cyber-physical critical infrastructures are created when traditional physical infrastructure is supplemented with advanced monitoring, control, computing, and communication capability. More intelligent decision support and improved efficacy, dependability,
and security are expected. Quantitative models and evaluation methods are required for
determining the extent to which a cyber-physical infrastructure improves on its physical
predecessors. It is essential that these models reflect both cyber and physical aspects of
operation and failure. In this dissertation, we propose quantitative models for dependability attributes, in particular, survivability, of cyber-physical systems. Any malfunction or
security breach, whether cyber or physical, that causes the system operation to depart from
specifications will affect these dependability attributes. Our focus is on data corruption,
which compromises decision support — the fundamental role played by cyber infrastructure. The first research contribution of this work is a Petri net model for information
exchange in cyber-physical systems, which facilitates i) evaluation of the extent of data corruption at a given time, and ii) illuminates the service degradation caused by propagation
of corrupt data through the cyber infrastructure. In the second research contribution, we
propose metrics and an evaluation method for survivability, which captures the extent of
functionality retained by a system after a disruptive event. We illustrate the application of
our methods through case studies on smart grids, intelligent water distribution networks,
and intelligent transportation systems. Data, cyber infrastructure, and intelligent control are
part and parcel of nearly every critical infrastructure that underpins daily life in developed
countries. Our work provides means for quantifying and predicting the service degradation
caused when cyber infrastructure fails to serve its intended purpose. It can also serve as the
foundation for efforts to fortify critical systems and mitigate inevitable failures.
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NOMENCLATURE

Acronyms
CPSs Cyber Physical Systems
ITS

Intelligent Transportation System

IWDS Intelligent Water Distribution System
MIS

Markov Chain Imbeddable Structure

1. INTRODUCTION

Modern critical infrastructures are large networked cyber-physical systems (CPSs).
CPSs improve efficacy, dependability, and other attributes by supplementing a traditional
physical system with computation, networking, and control [1, 2]. In CPSs, sensors collect information about the operational state of the physical system and communicate this
information in real-time to computers and embedded systems used for intelligent control.
Examples of modern critical infrastructures CPSs include smart grids, intelligent water
distribution networks, and intelligent transportation systems.
CPSs are deployed in unpredictable environments; as such, modeling and analysis
of their behavior in response to disruptive events is a critical challenge. Modeling and
evaluation are used to determine if a system design meets the specified levels of performance
(as measured by functional attributes) or dependability (a non-functional attribute).
Traditional dependability attributes, such as reliability and availability, utilize a
binary view of system functionality (i.e., operational or failed). However, the size and
complexity of CPSs make it likely that component failures will place the system in a
functionally degraded, but operational, state that is better captured by attributes such as
survivability and resilience, each of which can capture degraded operation. One focus of
the research presented in this dissertation is on modeling and evaluation of dependability
attributes for CPSs. Specifically, we quantify survivability, which captures the ability of a
CPS to deliver essential services despite being in a degraded operational state.
The intelligent control utilized by CPSs requires access to real-time and historical
data from the vicinity of each control entity, as well as system-wide information, to calculate
ideal control settings. The reliance on real-time field data makes CPS susceptible to
consequences of data corruption — unintended changes to data that occur during writing,
reading, storage, transmission, or processing. A functional control system that processes
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corrupted data will produce incorrect control settings, defying the purpose of intelligent
control and compromising decision support. Given the critical role of data, among the
potential disruptions that can degrade the operation of a CPS, we focus on data corruption.
The specific research problems addressed are the limited understanding of data dependencies
and interdependencies among components of a system and the lack of quantitative models
that can capture the propagation of corrupt data and its consequences for system operation.
To our knowledge, as of the date of publication, no existing model directly evaluates
systems based on the presence or propagation of corrupted data. Some models can account
for corrupted data by modeling a component as “failed;” however, this does not account
for the possibility of degraded or erroneous behaviors. Quantitative models and evaluation
techniques for data corruption in CPSs are the subject of this work.

1.1. MOTIVATION
In most complex systems, data corruption is unavoidable. Erroneous data can
be created through unintentional means, such as failures in sensors, processors, storage,
or communication hardware, or intentionally, through a cyber or physical attack. Data
corruption can have severe consequences for critical systems. Kirilenko et al. [3] describe a
financial computing system failure that occurred in August of 2012. A software error ended
up costing Knight Capital, a mid-size financial firm, $450 million, at a rate of $10 million
per minute. In this case, a cyber malfunction led to corrupted output data — trading prices.
In CPSs, the tight coupling between the cyber and physical infrastructures increases
the likelihood and exacerbates the consequences of data corruption. In addition to economic
consequences, failures in critical infrastructure and manufacturing systems can result in the
loss of life. One of these failures is presented by Miller et al. [4]. In June 1999, a Bellingham,
WA gas pipeline ruptured and leaked 237,000 gallons of gasoline, which ignited and burned
approximately 25 acres of forest, resulting in three deaths and eight documented injuries.
The failure was exacerbated by the inability of the control systems to react, due to the
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company’s practice of performing database development work on the system while it was
operating, which made real-time data unavailable. While this example is not the result of
corrupted data, it demonstrates CPSs’ reliance on accurate real-time data and the potential
consequences of corrupted data - missing data caused a cyber malfunction.
Lastly, a very recent example of corrupted data causing a control failure is the
ExoMars Schiaparelli Mars Lander crash on October 19, 2016 [5]. During the descent
onto Mars, the lander’s inertial measurement unit produced an erroneous measurement that
persisted for about 1 sec. This erroneous data caused the navigation system to generate
an estimated altitude that was below ground level. This, in turn, triggered the premature
release of the parachute, as though the lander had already landed, and caused the lander
to fall 3.7 km. While this example is not a critical infrastructure CPS, it does show the
potential for severe consequences of erroneous data. In this case, corrupted data caused a
physical malfunction. All of these examples demonstrate the dependence of CPSs on timely
and accurate data.

1.2. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
This dissertation serves as the culmination of my research activities. The broad
topical areas related to my research are CPS modeling, survivability evaluation, and data
corruption. A taxonomy of related topics is depicted in Figure 1.1.
Modeling of
Dependability Attributes

Analysis of Data
Corruption

Critical Infrastructure
Cyber-Physical Systems
Intelligent Water
Distribution Networks

Reliability

Survivability

Sources

Detection

Smart Grids
Availability

Performability

Consequences

Mitigation
Intelligent Transportation
Systems

Resilience

Figure 1.1. Taxonomy of research topics.
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The original research contributions presented in this dissertation include:
1. Quantitative modeling of CPS reliability with Markov imbedded structures, where the
system-level reliability of a CPS is evaluated as a function of the respective reliabilities
of the control system and cyber infrastructure. The approach is demonstrated with a
case study using an intelligent water distribution network.
2. Defining metrics and an evaluation method for CPS survivability, where a domainspecific figure-of-merit captures the extent and rate of degradation during a disruptive
event. This approach is demonstrated with a case study on several smart grids.
3. Component prioritization approach for targeted hardening of CPSs, where components are ranked based on their fragility and criticality, which are calculated from the
survivability metrics. This is demonstrated with a case study on several smart grids.
4. Survivability modeling for intelligent transportation systems, where manned, semiand fully-autonomous vehicles operate in the same environment.
5. Qualitative and quantitative models for the propagation of corrupted data in CPSs,
where the qualitative model elucidates the potential for propagation of corrupted data
in the course of information exchange among control entities of a CPS. The quantitative model measures the state of data in the system as information is exchanged,
providing a basis for examining the propagation of corrupted data. The quantitative
model can be used in conjunction with the proposed survivability evaluation approach.
This model and analysis are demonstrated with a case study using an IEEE 57-bus
smart grid system.
The intellectual merit of my work is in a) advancing knowledge and enabling prediction of the consequences of data corruption, and b) creating quantitative representations
of the effects of data corruption on system dependability. The broader impact of my work
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is in enabling justifiable reliance on cyber-physical critical infrastructure, which can result
in increased public safety and efficacy, as well as reduced cost.
The following publications have resulted from this research:
1. M. Woodard and S. Sedigh Sarvestani, “Modeling of autonomous vehicle operation in
intelligent transportation systems,” in Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop
on Software Engineering for Resilient Systems, pp. 133–140, 2013.
2. K. Marashi, M. Woodard, S. Sedigh Sarvestani, and A. R. Hurson, “Quantitative
reliability analysis for intelligent water distribution networks,” in Proceedings of
the Embedded Topical Meeting on Risk Management for Complex Socio-Technical
Systems, Annual Meeting of the American Nuclear Society, November 2013.
3. M. Woodard, S. Sedigh Sarvestani, and A. R. Hurson, “A survey of research on data
corruption in cyber-physical critical infrastructure systems,” vol. 98 of Advances in
Computers, pp. 59–87, Elsevier, 2015.
4. M. Woodard, M. Wisely, and S. Sedigh Sarvestani, “A survey of data cleansing
techniques for cyber-physical critical infrastructure systems,” vol. 102 of Advances in
Computers, pp. 63–110, Elsevier, 2016.
5. M. Woodard, K. Marashi, and S. Sedigh Sarvestani, “Survivability evaluation and
importance analysis for complex networked systems,” Submitted to IEEE Transactions
on Network Science and Management, 2017.
6. N. Jarus, M. Woodard, K. Marashi, S. Sedigh Sarvestani, J. Lin, A. Faza, and P. Maheshwari, “Survey on modeling and design of cyber-physical systems,” Submitted to
ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems, 2017.
7. M. Woodard, S. Sedigh Sarvestani, and A. R. Hurson, “A Petri-net model for propagation of corrupted data in a networked system,” In Preparation for Reliability
Engineering & System Safety, 2017.
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This dissertation covers two related topics - modeling of dependability attributes for
CPS, and modeling of CPS behavior. For ease of reference, the background and related work
for each topic immediately precedes the description of the related research contribution.
Section 2 discusses dependability attributes and the state-of-the-art in their modeling and
evaluation. This section begins with a discussion of the background and related work in
reliability modeling and evaluation in Section 2.1 followed by my work in CPS reliability
modeling in Section 2.2. A discussion of related work in performability, resilience and
survivability modeling is presented in Section 2.3, followed by my work in survivability
evaluation and component importance analysis in Section 2.4.
Section 3 discusses system behavior modeling. This section begins with an overview
of intelligent transportation systems in Section 3.1, followed by my proposed model for
autonomous vehicle behavior, in Section 3.2. A discussion of related work in data corruption
and data cleansing as it pertains to CPSs is presented in Section 3.3. My qualitative
and quantitative models for the propagation of corrupted data in CPSs are articulated in
Section 3.4. This dissertation concludes with Section 4, where future extensions to the
work are also described.
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2. MODELING AND EVALUATION OF DEPENDABILITY ATTRIBUTES FOR
CPS

Two types of attributes characterize systems: functional and non-functional. The
functional requirements of a CPS describe the operational and performance requirements
for the cyber and physical infrastructure of that system. Security, interoperability, and
reliability, which drive the design of all CPS infrastructures, are examples of non-functional
attributes.
Dependability is the ability of a system to provide a justifiably trustable level of
service [13]. It describes the behavior of a system over its lifetime: its ability to deliver
services and to avoid and recover from faults. Avizienis et al. [13] provide a taxonomy
of dependability aspects, which are summarized here. Dependability is a broad concept
that encompasses many metrics, including availability, reliability, safety, integrity, and
maintainability. Metrics may be qualitative, describing principles of system design and
behavior, or quantitative, providing a means to compare different systems’ operations.
In order to define various metrics, an understanding of the types of system events
that may be measured is required. These definitions are from the work of [14]. At the lowest
abstraction level is the system component, which may experience a defect. A fault occurs
when a component (whether defective or simply improperly designed) ceases to perform its
function perfectly. Faults are undetectable by system monitoring but may be found through
thorough examination. An error occurs when one or more faults threaten to compromise
system performance. A failure occurs when the system is unable to perform as intended;
that is, the service the system provides is degraded. Failures may be localized to one area
of a system (such as a power grid not serving some customers); a complete failure causes
the system to cease functioning entirely.
System dependability was initially defined in terms of reliability, availability, and
robustness. These metrics take a binary view of the system: either it is functional or
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it has entirely failed. However, these metrics are considered to be too pessimistic to
accurately model large-scale systems and thus cyber-physical systems. For example, a
nation-wide power grid may experience a service outage in one area, but may still, be
providing service to other areas. This led to the development of more granular metrics,
such as performability, resilience, and survivability that take the level of service a system
provides into consideration. Dependability metrics also differ based on which portion of
the system lifecycle they measure. As such, no one metric can claim to entirely capture
system dependability; several models must be used to judge the trustworthiness of a system’s
service. Figure 2.1 shows the portions of system lifetime modeled by these metrics.
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Figure 2.1. Interval of system lifetime covered by aspects of dependability.

2.1. RELIABILITY
Reliability is concerned with system behavior before a failure. Reliability is the
ability of an item to perform a required function under given conditions for a given time
interval [15]. However, once the system fails, reliability does not consider partial system
functionality or the system’s ability to recover; thus, it is a binary measure of continuous
operation. In other words, reliability considers every system failure to be a complete
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failure. Reliability is mathematically modeled using probability. Let X be a continuous
random variable representing the system lifetime beginning at the time origin and ending
at the instant of system failure. A system’s reliability at time t can be expressed as in
Equation 2.1.
R(t) = Pr {X > t}

(2.1)

If F(t) denotes the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of X, reliability can be expressed
as in Equation 2.2.
R(t) = 1 − F(t)

(2.2)

Or in other words, the reliability of a system is the probability of it not failing within some
interval [0, t].
One of the earliest reliability analysis tools is the fault tree [16]. Fault trees encode
the connections among system components using logic gates. Different types of gates
represent the different effects the failure of a component can have on the system. For
instance, an AND gate indicates that both subsystems it relates must be functional; this
would apply to a system of two components connected in series, among others. An OR
gate would model a system with two parallel components that requires both to experience
a fault before the system fails. The tree of gates can be analyzed using either analytical
or numerical methods [16, 17]. They may also be converted to reliability block diagrams
for analysis [18]. While fault trees are intuitive, it is difficult to capture some types of
component interdependence with them. Thus, modeling some complex systems with fault
trees can be labor-intensive.
Reliability block diagrams (RBDs) [19] provide another visual means of modeling
reliability. Instead of the logic gates of the fault tree, system components are represented as
switches in an electrical circuit. If the circuit remains complete between input and output,
the system remains functional. As such, RBDs can be used to analyze the probability
of the system being functional and thus the system’s reliability. Additional analysis can
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be performed by converting the RBD to a fault tree and applying appropriate analysis
techniques [18]. In particular, Boolean algebra can be used to reduce the complexity of the
RBD and thus simplify analysis [20].
Markov chains have been applied to reliability modeling in numerous ways [21]. A
Markov chain consists of states in which a system may be and transitions among those states
that are taken with some probability. The Markov assumption constrains these probabilities:
assuming that the probability of transitioning to a given state depends only on the state the
system is currently in. Formally, if Xn is a random variable denoting the state of the system
at time step n, the probability can be expressed as in Equation 2.3.
P{Xn = xn |Xn−1 = xn−1, . . . , X1 = x1 } = P{Xn = xn |Xn−1 = xn−1 }

(2.3)

One notable technique, the Markov chain imbeddable structure (MIS) method, is
presented in [22, 23]. Each state in the Markov chain represents one of the possible
permutations of system component failure. The states that result in overall system failure
are identified. Transitions between states take place with a probability dependent on the
reliability of individual components. System reliability is then defined as the likelihood of
being in a functional system state after taking one step through the Markov chain for each
component in the system. The MIS technique thus models system reliability as a function
of individual component reliability.
Stochastic Petri nets (SPNs) are another tool used extensively for modeling reliability. A Petri net is a bipartite directed graph where the set of nodes consists of two disjoint
sets: places and transitions [24]. Directed arcs connect places to transitions and transitions
to places. Each place contains a non-negative number of tokens. The state of the system,
referred to as the marking, is dictated by the distribution of tokens in various places within
the Petri net. The change in the Petri net’s marking is controlled by the firing condition
of the transitions. For instance, a transition may fire once each place that has an arc to
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that transition contains a token. When a transition fires, tokens are removed from places
connected to the transition by an input arc and are added to places connected to the transition
by an output arc. The transitions in an SPN utilize exponentially distributed firing times.
SPNs provide a graphical model of system behavior similar to Markov chains. For
analysis, they can be reduced to continuous-time Markov chains (CTMCs) to obtain a
steady-state representation of reliability [24]. SPNs provide a more concise representation
of a system than traditional CTMC modeling, as each marking of the Petri net corresponds
to a state in a CTMC. Extensions of SPNs have been proposed for modeling more complex
systems, including high-level smart grid control centers [25] and subcomponents such as
multi-source power systems [26].

2.2. QUANTITATIVE RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF CPS
CPSs incorporate components of heterogeneous domains, hence, addressing the
issue of developing a comprehensive model of CPS is a complex task and requires a
thorough knowledge of the joint dynamics of embedded computers, software, networks,
and physical processes [2]. Modeling issues of CPSs have been addressed by quite a few
investigations, most of them focusing on the problem from a qualitative point of view. Faza et
al. [27] is one example of the very few studies that address quantitative modeling of CPSs.
It develops a mathematical reliability model that captures impairments of both physical
and cyber processes and demonstrates its applicability on smart power grids. Similarly,
few studies have presented quantitative reliability models that capture physical and cyber
processes in Intelligent Water Distribution Networks (IWDN).
A completely satisfactory IWDN should supply water in the required quantities
at desired residual heads throughout a specified period. How well an IWDN can satisfy
this goal can be determined from water-supply reliability. However, evaluation of IWDN
reliability is relatively complex because reliability depends on a large number of parameters,
some of which are the quality and quantity of water available at the source, power outages,
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pipe breaks and valve failures, variation in demands, and failure of networked computers
that regulate the water flow through the widespread water supply network. However, the
dependability of IWDNs has not been researched thoroughly. The reliability of WDNs,
from a purely physical point of view, has long been a topic of interest to the civil engineering
community.
Dasic and Djordjevic [28] used mechanical reliability (probability of pipe failure)
and hydraulic reliability (probability of pressure and velocity being satisfactory) to present
a method for reliability evaluation of water distribution systems. Jun et al. [29] aimed
to quantitatively measure the failure impact in terms of expanding subnetworks and the
number of customers out of service. Ezell et al. [30] proposed a probabilistic risk analysis
model to capture a water distribution system’s interconnections and interdependencies.
Wagner et al. [31] proposed analytical methods for computing the reachability (the
case in which a given demand node is connected to at least one source) and connectivity
(the case in which every demand node is connected to at least one source) as topological
measures for water distribution system reliability. The study was complemented through
stochastic simulations in which the system is modeled as a network whose components are
subject to failure with given probability distributions. Probabilities of a specific shortfall,
number of failure events in a simulation period, and inter-failure times and repair durations
are used as reliability measures.
Gupta and Bhave [32] discuss different failure conditions, and obtain water flows for
the part of the network that remained after the removal of pipes (contingency analysis), and
use them in reliability assessment. Mays [33] presented a survey and reviewed methods for
risk and reliability evaluation of water distribution systems. This survey discusses reliability
and availability of repairable and nonrepairable WDNs and investigates algorithms for
optimal solutions to reliability-based designs of WDNs. In a more recent study, Torii and
Lopez [34] investigate the application of the adaptive response surface approach to the
reliability analysis of WDNs.
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In some of the aforementioned studies, simulation tools are utilized to develop
models that describe the behavior of a system. Specialized models and simulation tools
exist for the engineering domains represented in critical infrastructure, including power,
water, and transportation. They have been created with the objective of accurately reflecting the operation of the physical system at high spatial and temporal resolution. However,
intelligent control is usually not captured in these tools, leaving them incapable of representing cyber-physical infrastructure systems. Interdependencies among the cyber and
physical components, in operation and failure, present a major challenge, as they invalidate
simplified models that assume components will fail independently [35, 36].
This work differs from the above-mentioned studies in that it presents a quantitative model that spans the cyber and physical and captures the interdependencies (and tight
coupling) inherent to any CPS. Ideally, a quantitative reliability model for an IWDN would
present a mathematical form that encompasses impairments of the system, originating from
both physical domain (e.g., pipes), and cyber processes (e.g., control software, communication links, and sensors). As such, the MIS technique was selected as the foundation the
model.
2.2.1. Markov Chain Imbeddable Structure for CPS Reliability. The specific
contribution of this section is a quantitative model that captures the overall reliability
of a CPS. This work was published in [7]. The foundation of this model is the MIS
technique, which classifies the states of a system into “functional” and “failed” states, in
effect partitioning them based on their effect on reliability. This technique derives a metric
for system reliability from component-level reliability measures. Each component can be
in either a functional or a failed state. The combinations of component states that result
in a failed system are identified. Then, a Markov chain is constructed where transitions
between system states occur when components fail. Analysis of the Markov chain reveals
the probability that the system remains functional after a certain number of component
failures. Faza et. al [27] use this technique to compare changes to cyber control algorithms
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and cyber device placements in a CPS, as well as the effect of physical faults on the control
system. Their work provides methods for reducing model complexity, making the modeling
of real-world CPSs feasible with the MIS technique.
This technique was applied to compare the effects of cyber and physical component failures on overall system reliability by modeling the cyber infrastructure as a single
component with a specific reliability.
2.2.2. Markov Chain Imbeddable Structure. The Markov imbeddable structure
(MIS) technique [37] models system reliability as a function of individual component
reliability. The MIS technique involves the following steps. First, the set of vulnerable
components of the system is recognized. Subsequently, the state of the system can be
defined as a binary vector. The state of a system with n components can be represented
by an n-dimensional binary vector, S, where its i th element reflects the operational state of
the corresponding component. There are 2n such vectors exist, reflecting all possible states
of the system. Next, each of the 2n system states is inspected to determine if the overall
system is “functional” or “failed”. The MIS model then computes the system reliability as
the probability of being in one of the “functional” system states.
The system reliability is computed as follows. Let Π0 denote a vector of probabilities,
where Pr(Y0 = Si ) is the probability of the system initially being in state Si . In a normal
system, the initial state would be S0 , which represents a system with no component failures
as in Equation 2.4.
Π0 = [Pr(Y0 = S0 ), Pr(Y0 = S1 ), . . . , Pr(Y0 = SN )]T

(2.4)

Furthermore, for a given component, l, the matrix Λl represents the state transition probabilities of the system as a function of l. In other words, each element pi j (l) in the matrix Λl
represents the probability that the system will make a transition from state Si to state S j due
to the failure of component l. Finally, a vector u is defined, with length equal to 2n , where
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each element has a value of 1 if the corresponding state is considered a “functional” state
for the system, and 0 otherwise. The overall reliability of the n-component system can be
expressed as in Equation 2.5
R = (Π0 )T

n
Ö

!
Λl u

(2.5)

l=1

2.2.3. Case Study: Intelligent Water Distribution Network. In this section, the
proposed approach is demonstrated by applying it to an intelligent water distribution network
(IWDN). Figure 2.2 depicts a practical example of an IWDN. Information such as demand
patterns, water quantity (flow and pressure head), and water quality (contaminants and
minerals) is critical for providing a dependable supply of potable water and is beneficial in
guiding maintenance efforts and identifying vulnerable areas requiring fortification and/or
monitoring. Sensors dispersed in the physical infrastructure collect this information, which
is fed to the distributed algorithms running on the cyber infrastructure. These algorithms
provide decision support to hardware controllers (e.g., valves), which are used to control
the quantity and quality of the water.

Figure 2.2. An intelligent water distribution network.
The case study IWDN used was based on the network described and analyzed in
[31]. The case study IWDN, depicted in Figure 2.3, consisted of two sources (reservoir node
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1, and tank node 11), nine demand nodes (2-10), four valves (96, 97, 98, 99), and thirteen
pipes (1-11, 98a, 98b). Table 2.1 shows the parameters of some important nodes and pipes
of this WDN as used in the simulations. Additional components such as a tank and multiple
valves were added to create a more robust system but the basic structure (i.e., elevation of
nodes and topology of the network), as well as the supply and demand specifications, were
not altered.
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Figure 2.3. Topology of intelligent water distribution network.
The reservoir is capable of providing an infinite supply of water, while the tank’s
supply is limited by the tank diameter and water level, which are set at initialization. The
system has a single pump located at the reservoir that maintains the flow and head. The
pipes and valves are the major components that control the flow and provide water to the
consumers represented by the demand nodes.
2.2.3.1. Component failures. The vulnerable physical components selected for
this reliability analysis included pipes, valves, pumps, and tanks. The IWDN used in this
case study had a total of 20 failable components, resulting in 20 single component failure
cases and 190 double component failure cases. All failed components were simulated
as being in a zero-state (i.e., failures of pipes, valves, pumps, and tanks were evaluated
by essentially removing the component from the system). The decision support system
consisting of sensors, communication infrastructure, and computing systems was modeled
EPANET
2

Page 1
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Table 2.1. Parameters of intelligent water distribution network.
Node
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
8a
4a
6a
5a
Pipes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
98a
99a

Elevation (ft)
100
100
200
210
230
250
10
10
50
25
10
210
250
230
From node/To node
2/3
3/4
3/6a
4/5a
6/5
8/7
8/9
7/9
10/7
7/10
11/6
4a/10
5/8a

Demand (mgd)
-6.625
0.7355
1.2
0.6
0.4
0.82
0.6
0.8
0.4
0.2
0
0
0
0
Length (ft)
200
1500
1800
2000
1900
1000
2500
3500
1500
1500
1000
500
500

Normal head (ft)
100
388.48
386.43
376.80
377.54
380.05
173.57
170.31
160.87
181.37
Diameter (in.)
16
12
14
10
14
8
10
8
10
6
12
6
4

Minimum head
146
246
256
276
296
56
56
96
96
Roughness
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
100
65
65

as a single component that was classified as either functional or failed. The failure of
the decision support was evaluated as a purely physical system. While the physical and
intelligent control components can fail into non-zero states, these states were not evaluated
for simplicity and will be explored in future work.
2.2.3.2. System failure. The MIS technique requires the functional and failed system states to be defined. These definitions are based on the system’s service parameters. In
an IWDN, a system is considered “failed” if the pressure and/or flow drop below a specified
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value at one or more nodes [38]. For this case study, a system failure is defined as one or
more of the following three cases.
1. Negative pressure case: If the IWDN exhibits a negative pressure in any pipe or node.
A negative pressure in a component will result in additional component failures and
further system degradation.
2. Quality failure case: If the system fails to provide a minimum of 80% of the demand
at every node. While there are many cases where only one node’s demand is not
met and the remaining nodes are supplied with the full demand, the system is still
considered failed due to unsatisfactory supply.
3. Excessive fault case: If three or more components have failed. This case is the
threshold case, set based on the size and number of components of the system.
2.2.3.3. System state inspection. A simulation was used to observe the operation
of the IWDN and to determine the failed and functional states. Initially, a purely physical
WDN was constructed and simulated using EPANET 2.0 [39]. EPANET is a WDN simulator
developed by the US Environmental Protection Agency to simulate functional aspects of
the system such as demand patterns, water quantity (flow and pressure head), and water
quality (contaminants and minerals). However, it has no capability to simulate intelligent
decision support, so to simulate the operation of the intelligent control, a MATLAB control
algorithm described by Lin et al. in [40] was used.
The IWDN simulation was conducted as follows:
1. Set fault conditions
2. Run EPANET and generate report
3. Parse report and extract input for decision support
4. Run decision support algorithms to determine controller settings
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5. Output control settings as a .inp file
6. Provide .inp file to EPANET and produce simulation results
In order to simulate the IWDN, the method introduced by Lin et al. [41] was used.
The simulator produced a report which contained the flow and pressure at each node and
in each component as well as a negative pressure warning. These reports were parsed and
loaded into MATLAB to determine if the specified fault conditions resulted in a system
failure. Figure 2.4 illustrates the procedure to simulate the function of IWDN as a CPS.
EPANET (simulator for
physical infrastructure)

Matlab(simulator for cyber
infrastructure)

Initialize WDN
configuration

1. Run simulation
in EPANET and
generate report

2. Extract
simulation results

3. Run control
algorithms to
determine settings

5. Provide INP
file to EPANET

4. Export settings
as an INP file

Figure 2.4. Procedure to simulate an IWDN using EPANET and MATLAB.
2.2.4. Results. The results from single-component and double-component failures
were used to generate the mathematical reliability model. As previously stated, all triplecomponent failures were considered as failed states. Some of the failures are listed and
briefly described in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2. List of some component failures and their consequences.
Failed Component
Pump
Tank
Pipe 1
Pipe 6
Pipe 98a
Pipe 7 and Pipe 8
Valve 98
Valve 99

System State
Failed
Functional
Failed
Functional
Failed
Failed
Failed
Functional

Failure at hour
3
6
0
0
3
-

Failure description
negative pressures
negative pressures
negative pressures
negative pressures
negative pressures

The failure case observations were used to populate the u vector as described in
Section 2.2.2. Using Equation 2.5, the mathematical model of reliability for the IWDN case
study, Rsys , is developed as shown in Equation 2.6.
Rsys = pP .pT .p L 13 .pV 4 .pC + pP .qT .p L 13 .pV 4 .pC +

(2.6)

8pP .qT .p L 12 .qL .pV 4 .pC + pP .qT .p L 13 .pV 4 .qC +
10pP .pT .p L 12 .qL .pV 4 .pC + 31pP .pT .p L 11 .qL 2 .pV 4 .pC +
16pP .pT .p L 12 .qL .pV 3 .qV .pC + 5pP .pT .p L 12 .qL .pV 4 .qC +
3pP .pT .p L 13 .pV 3 .qV .pC + pP .pT .p L 13 .pV 4 .qC
In this mathematical model, pP is the reliability of the pump, pT is the reliability of the tank,
p L is the reliability of the pipes, pV is the reliability of valves, and pC is the overall reliability
of the control algorithm. The unreliabilities are expressed as qT = 1 − pT , qL = 1 − p L ,
qV = 1 − pV , and qC = 1 − pC for the corresponding components. This model is a simplified
version and holds true when all similar components are equireliable (i.e., p Li = p L, ∀i, and
pVi = pV , ∀i).
In Figures 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7, the comparison among the system reliability with
different values for reliabilities of the control system, pump, and valves, respectively.
Comparing these three figures illustrates that the effect of using reliable valves and pumps
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on the overall reliability of the system is more important than using a reliable control system
that implements the intelligent decision support. This is because the model distinguishes
between basic rule-based control routines (which is conducted in EPANET) and intelligent
decision support (which is conducted in MATLAB). Failure of control system does not
eliminate the basic IF-THEN rules that control valves and pumps in the WDN. Hence, the
effect of the reliability of the actuators on the overall reliability of the system as a whole is
higher than that of the intelligent decision support.
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Figure 2.5. System reliability, comparison among control systems with different reliabilities.
pP = pT = pV = 0.97
2.2.5. Summary of Research Contribution. The research contribution presented
in Section 2.2 is a system-level reliability model for critical infrastructure CPSs based on
the MIS technique. This reliability model was demonstrated using an IWDN as a case
study. The IWDN consisted of a control system, two sources, nine demand nodes, four
valves, and thirteen pipes. The control system was added to the system to prevent against
potential failures and increase the reliability of the water distribution system. The failed
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Figure 2.6. System reliability, comparison among pumps with different reliabilities. pC =
pT = pV = 0.97

and functional system states were determined by setting an acceptable service threshold and
evaluating failure cases using EPANET and MATLAB as physical infrastructure and cyber
infrastructure simulators, respectively. This state information was then used in the MIS
technique to develop a mathematical reliability model for the IWDN. Comparison among
the results of the simulations shows that the effect of impairments of low-level actuators (e.g.,
valves), on the functionality of the system is more intense than that of high-level decision
support that finely adjusts the settings in order to reach the highly-efficient operation.
In future studies, additional cyber and physical component fault states would be
included to incorporate a more realistic behavior of the system. Moreover, the decision
support system will be modeled as multiple components in a hierarchical structure with
sensors at the bottom moving up to the computing systems with communication links
connecting these elements. Initially, each of these control subcomponents will be modeled
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Figure 2.7. System reliability, comparison among valves with different reliabilities. pP =
pT = pC = 0.97

as a failed system and then expanded to analyze other faulty states to evaluate systems with
degraded states.

2.3. SURVIVABILITY, PERFORMABILITY AND RESILIENCE
Although dependability attributes are well studied for small- to large-scale networks and systems, they fall short in describing characteristics of modern complex CPSs.
For example, reliability and availability, two important aspects of dependability, consider
the system state to be binary—operational or failed. This view is inadequate for critical
infrastructures, which are expected to deliver uninterrupted service despite continual disturbances. It is expected that a large-scale system will spend time in functionally degraded
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states without interruption of essential services. Consequently, additional dependability
attributes are required to characterize these degraded, yet operational, states.
Performability, introduced by Meyer et al. [42], combines performance and availability to evaluate system effectiveness, taking into account behavior due to failures. In
other words, a system can be in a fully functional state, a partially operational state with
degraded performance, or a failed state. Performability evaluates the expected performance
over a duration composed of alternating functional/degraded/failed periods. System capability quantifies the extent to which users can expect to benefit from a system when it is in
a specific state. Iyer et al. [43] discuss developing performability models of fault-tolerant
systems that use a capability function, M(t), to relate the state of a system at time t to the
overall system performance level.
The performability of a system from the time origin t0 to time t is given by Equation 2.7.
Per f sys (t) =

∫

t

M(x) dx

(2.7)

t0

In this equation, M(t) is the reward function associated with performance per unit time and
t is the mission time of the system. The mission time of the system is the duration over
which the system is expected to be operational. Performability is focused on mission time
and becomes difficult to calculate if repairs occur during operation since the mission time
can then become unbounded. CPS performability evaluation techniques are presented in
[44, 45] using Markov reward models—Markov chains that earn a reward dependent on the
state the system is in. Performability is useful for evaluating systems that are initially in a
perfect functional state but it fails to capture repairs after a complete failure and subsequently
fails to capture long-term system operation.
Resilience takes a more refined view of system availability. Resilience is defined as
the ability of a system to “bounce back” from failure [46, 47], but its application is limited
to the recovery phase that follows a failure and not any period beforehand. Avizienis et
al/ [13] mention resilience as a synonym for fault tolerance. Ouyang et al. [48] expand
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this definition to include the ability of a system to resist different possible hazards, absorb
initial damage from a failure or attack, and recover to normal operation. Mathematically,
resilience is defined in Equation 2.8.
Λ(t) =

M(t)
M(t0 )

(2.8)

As with performability, all quantitative resilience measures rely on some measure M(t) of
system functionality at time t, alternatively known as a capability function or a figure-ofmerit [46, 49].
Ghosh et al. [50] outline a procedure for developing resilience metrics from reliability, performability, or availability models. First, a stochastic model for the chosen
dependability attribute is developed. Next, a particular metric on this model is chosen as
the measure of system functionality. Finally, structural or parametric changes, which may
include component faults, are made to the system, and the resulting change in functionality
is observed. Albasrawi et al. [51] apply this methodology to measure not only the loss of
functionality resulting from a cascading failure in a power grid but also the rate at which
functionality is regained by different recovery actions. The choice of recovery actions
is governed by the maintainability of the system, demonstrating that maintainability and
resilience are interrelated.
Nan et al. [52] identify three components of system resilience: ability to absorb
faults, ability to adapt and reconfigure in order to reduce the impact of faults, and ability
to restore service after degradation. The authors propose a figure-of-merit-based resilience
metric that captures these components; it also captures the ability of systems to recover to
a level of functionality higher than their initial state. They develop a method for applying
this resilience metric to complex, interdependent systems where no unified figure-of-merit
exists. The interdependent system is divided into subsystems for which a figure-of-merit
can be defined, and the interdependencies between subsystems are then quantified using
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input and output variables that allow for simultaneous simulation of subsystem models.
Results from simulations can be used to identify the relative effect of each interdependency
on overall system resilience and on components that can be improved in order to increase
system resilience.
Resilience is extended to systems-of-systems by [53]. The authors develop models
that incorporate resilience metrics from several systems, including models of the effects of
one system’s failure on the resilience of the others. For example, a blackout in part of the
power grid may cut power to water distribution centers and trigger a failure in the water
distribution network. They model this failure propagation using a deterministic cause-effect
model. However, this may not capture all the effects of other systems on the resilience of the
system under consideration since the state of other systems can affect both the likelihood of
a component fault and the maintenance time required to recover the system after a failure.
Survivability is another dependability attribute that was introduced with a similar
objective and is used to characterize degraded operation. Survivability, unlike resilience,
can be used to describe degraded operation at any point after a disturbance occurs regardless
of whether the disturbance is a fault tolerated by the system or a failure that actually causes
degradation. The roots of survivability are in military applications that focus on mission
fulfillment. Most definitions of survivability are qualitative; for example, [54] define it as
the capability of a system to fulfill its mission in a timely manner in the presence of attacks,
failures, or accidents. The mission of a system is a set of very high-level requirements or
goals for that system; timeliness means the mission is fulfilled by a user-specified time.
Queiroz et al. [55] define survivability as the capacity of essential services to provide their
functionalities in cases of malicious attacks that compromise parts of the system. Such
functionalities may rely on other services of the system that are not necessarily essential.
The definition focuses on a specific service or component that must survive and how the
interdependency between services affects that survivability.
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Critical CPSs, including smart grids, are expected to autonomously defend against
attacks, remediate the consequences of failure, and recover in a timely manner. Dependability attributes provide a coarse-grained characterization of these qualities, unlike survivability metrics, whose very purpose is to precisely characterize transient behavior after a
disturbance. For this exact reason, it is used in several different domains including weapons
systems engineering [56], telecommunication services [57], information systems [54], and
software engineering [58].
No standard definition of survivability was identified at the time of publication,
perspectives on the topic are diverse [59]. A qualitative and concise definition is presented
by Heegaard and Trivedi [60]:
“Survivability is the system’s ability to continuously deliver services in compliance with the given requirements in the presence of failures and other undesired
events.”
The ANSI T1A1.2 working group [61] using a domain-specific FoM, as shown in
Figure 2.1, to quantitatively defined survivability for networked systems:
“Suppose a measure of interest M has the value m0 just before a failure occurs.
The survivability behavior can be depicted by the following attributes: ma is the
value of M just after the failure occurs; mu is the maximum difference between
the value of M and ma after the failure; mr is the restored value of M after some
time tr ; and t R is the time for the system to restore the value of m0 .”
Comparison of survivability evaluation techniques is complicated by the lack of a
common definition for this attribute. A number of approaches have been used to model
survivability. Zhang et al. [62] present a qualitative approach using attack graphs. In this
approach, an attack graph is created using known system vulnerabilities and their associated
difficulty parameters. Each path represents a series of exploits leading to an undesirable
state, each node represents the network states under attack, and each directed edge represents
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an attack action. Survivability analysis is conducted by defining the states in the attack graph
where the system fails completely and by determining the cost associated with each attack.
In this case, survivability is associated with the difficulty and the destruction level of an
attack, which quantitatively defines survivability as the minimal cost to compromise the
system. This model captures the probability that a system will meet its mission requirements
in the presence of an attack, but neglects the presence of survivable system enhancements.
It also does not model the timeliness or ability of a system to recover or account for the
graceful degradation of a system.
Knight et al. [63] present a survivability definition and model based on a service
state-transition graph constructed from a six-tuple of service specification levels, service
value factors, reachable environmental states, relative service values, set of valid transitions,
and service probabilities. Ma [64] similarly quantifies survivability as a four-tuple of
resistance, resilience, persistence, and failure count. In this study, resistance refers to
the ability to withstand an attack, resilience refers to the mean recovery time from a
catastrophic failure, persistence is the ability to maintain or exceed the minimal threshold
of required functionality, and failure count describes the number of failures encountered
over the duration of observation. These individual attributes are well-defined but disjoint,
and as such the study does not lead to a practical approach for quantitative evaluation of
survivability.
Liu and Trivedi [65] introduce a method of modeling survivability that uses continuous time Markov chains (CTMC) by combining a pure performance model and a pure
availability model to construct a composite performance-availability model. The pure availability model for a system’s resources is modeled as a birth-death process where each state
represents the number of functioning assets. The pure performance model is created using
task arrival rates and service rates for the system. This is also a birth-death process, but here
each state represents the number of assets currently tasked. The two models are combined
to create a composite model which is then truncated based on the survivability measure of
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interest. The desired survivability measures are obtained using transient analysis. Many extensions to this model have been presented to incorporate different aspects of survivability;
for instance, [66] developed a checking algorithm to decide whether a system is survivable.
Continuous stochastic logic [67] is used to phrase survivability in a precise manner for
CTMC models. Heegaard and Trivedi [60] expand and refine this method to determine
the scalability of the model, as well as to model additional performance measures such as
failure propagation and recovery using a phased recovery model.
Kim et al. [68] model the survivability of a wireless sensor network using a semiMarkov process (SMP) instead of a simple Markov chain. The SMP captures the behaviors
of attacks, system responses to the attacks, intrusion detection, and repairing mechanism
that cause sojourn time to be non-exponential.
System survivability has also been modeled using Petri nets. Castet and Saleh [69]
explore the applicability of stochastic Petri nets for multi-state failures and survivability
analysis. They model components with multiple operational states, allowing them to
analyze survivability and focus on failure propagation in the system that results in either
graceful degradation or catastrophic failure.
2.3.1. Alternative Survivability and Resilience Definitions. The majority of qualitative survivability and resilience definitions in the literature are similar to the ones presented in this survey. However, [70] use alternative definitions that are focused more on
communication networks and are thus less applicable to CPSs. They define resilience as
“the ability of the network to provide and maintain an acceptable level of service in the face
of various faults and challenges to normal operation,” which is analogous to the definitions
of survivability used elsewhere in this paper.
Sterbenz et al. [70] classify resilience as a field of related disciplines categorized
as challenge tolerance and trustworthiness. These disciplines target the dependability
attributes outlined previously in this section with more emphasis on security and networking
issues. Challenge tolerance captures network design issues such as traffic and disruption
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tolerance and survivability. The survivability sub-discipline encapsulates resistance to
multiple correlated failures, such as a disaster or attack, as well as fault tolerance and
resistance to few random independent failures. The other half of their definition of resilience,
trustworthiness, captures dependability [13], performability [42], and security.

2.4. SURVIVABILITY EVALUATION AND COMPONENT IMPORTANCE ANALYSIS OF NETWORKED SYSTEMS
A smart grid, which integrates cyber infrastructure with the traditional power grid,
is a prime example of cyber-physical critical infrastructure. In traditional power grids,
reliability and availability metrics, such as system average interruption duration index
(SAIDI), could sufficiently describe a system’s dependability. The integration of cyber
infrastructure, however, has motivated the use of more complex metrics such as survivability.
Menasché et al. [71] introduce a new metric extended-SAIDI (ESAIDI) for analyzing
survivability aspects of the smart grid. ESAIDI is an extended version of SAIDI for analysis
of the consequences of failures in distribution automation in the power grid. Avritzer et
al. [72] utilizes the same approach and extends the model to account for disruptions in the
communication infrastructure. This work was later combined with power flow analysis to
create a survivability model that facilitates optimal design for the automation system of
the smart grid [73]. The work was again extended to account for concurrent failures of
the power system [74]. All of these approaches [71, 72, 73, 74] use time-to-recovery as a
measure of survivability of the system. However, time-to-recovery includes both the failure
and the recovery processes, and thus the behavior of the system in each of these areas is
indistinguishable.
Alobaidi et al. [75] propose a quantitative approach for survivability evaluation of
smart grids by studying the relationship between system condition (in terms of a number
of functional components) and system capacity (ability to provide power to customers).
The authors also present recovery strategies that minimize the effect of failures on system
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survivability and verify the applicability of their proposed methods on a test case. A
limitation of [75] that is addressed in this work is the restriction to power grid systems.
In another study, Chopade and Bikdash [76] utilize a graph-theoretic method to
model the survivability of a smart grid. Graph-theoretic measures such as degree distribution and clustering coefficient are utilized, but all buses (vertices) and lines (edges) are
assumed to be identical. This is an unrealistic assumption, and the resulting survivability
model fails to capture differences in reliability, among other features, of the buses and lines.
Similar to the graph-theoretic approach, [77] quantitatively evaluates the survivability of
mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) by representing the probability that all active nodes
are k-connected to the network. A semi-Markov model that captures state transitions of
the network due to node failures and malicious attacks is used to determine this probability. The connectedness of MANETs is a measure of functionality of the system; thus, the
probability of being k-connected can reflect survivability. While connectivity is appropriate for MANETs, the evaluation method is inapplicable to systems with more complex
functionality.
A recent study by Avritzer et al. [59] presents common approaches for survivability
evaluation of critical infrastructures (namely, water, gas, and electricity infrastructures).
Stochastic hybrid models such as fluid stochastic Petri nets, hybrid Petri nets, and piecewise
deterministic Markov processes, as well as graph-theoretic approaches, are recommended
as methods for survivability evaluation of these systems.
For many systems, including critical infrastructures, the high availability required
makes it infeasible to bring down the system for fault injection studies. Detailed reports
of real-world failures are few and far between, and many of the potential failure scenarios
have never actually occurred in practice, which necessitates the use of simulation tools. No
simulation environment perfectly captures the characteristics of real-world entities; however,
simulation does provide a good understanding of system behavior at minimal cost. The
goal of this work is to enable survivability evaluation for complex networked systems with
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an approach that can rely upon data from simulation, laboratory and/or field observations,
and historical data about failure.
This work provides an approach for evaluating the survivability of networked systems
and identifying the components most critical to a system’s survivability. The survivability
evaluation approach relies upon the identification of a domain-specific figure-of-merit (FoM)
that is indicative of the extent to which one or more essential services are provided. A set
of representative failure cases are selected, and the FoM is tracked over the duration of each
disturbance in order to determine the rate and extent of service degradation. In this context,
a failure case is defined as failure of one or more specific components.
This definition and each task associated with the approach are described in Section 2.4.2. This work was published in [10].
Survivability evaluation can be incorporated into the system design cycle as follows:
1. An appropriate FoM and a set of representative failure cases are identified during the
initial design phase of the system.
2. Once the system is implemented, changes in the FoM are observed in a field, laboratory, or simulation environment over the duration of each failure case.
3. Survivability is quantified in terms of the extent and rate of degradation of the FoM.
4. Components whose failure is the most detrimental to survivability are identified and
hardened.
5. The process is repeated as necessary until desired levels of survivability are attained.
The distinction of this work is its broad applicability to a range of domains; the FoM
reflects domain-specific aspects of the system’s operation. The same breadth facilitates
analysis of cyber-physical systems, where features such as complexity and heterogeneity
render other methods inapplicable. The study presented in [52] is similar to this work
in extracting dependability features from a FoM; however, it is focused on comparing
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resilience of different system topologies against a single disruptive event and finding an
optimal recovery strategy.
2.4.1. Survivability Attributes. In [60], graceful degradation and failure resistance are described as two attributes essential to survivability. These attributes are defined
as metrics for survivability (with reference to Figure 2.1) as follows:
• Graceful degradation is achieved when the rate of degradation
dM(t)
dt

(2.9)

is considered to be slow after a disturbance, in the context of the time scale of the
system domain.
• Failure resistance has occurred when the extent of degradation

|M(td ) − M(te )|

(2.10)

resulting from a disturbance (i.e., the loss in FoM incurred between the start of the
disturbance and initiation of recovery), leaves the system functionality at a level
considered to be acceptable.
The FoM is domain-specific, as it is intended to capture the extent to which a
system is delivering essential services. In this work, the FoM represents a single service.
The survivability evaluation approach can be used to represent more complex behavior by
defining a FoM that is a composite metric (e.g., a weighted average of multiple FoM), that
reflects different essential services.
These two attributes are pivotal to the proposed approach to survivability evaluation
and importance analysis, which are described in Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3, respectively.
2.4.2. Evaluation of Survivability. The proposed approach for survivability evaluation has two phases:
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1. A system-specific FoM and a set of representative failure cases are selected to evaluate
the system. Each failure case is then observed or simulated, and the value of the FoM
is recorded.
2. Based on the log of FoM values, the rate and extent of degradation of the FoM are
calculated. The extent and rate of degradation are plotted on a two-dimensional figure
in order to facilitate analysis.
In this context, a failure case is defined by the set of distinct components, the
failure of which causes a disturbance to the system. In the broadest sense, the failure of
this set of components leads to a set of failure cases that differ in the chronological order
and exact timing of failures of the respective components. For simplicity and tractability,
all component failures of a failure case are considered to have occurred simultaneously,
and as such, failure case j, denoted as F j , can be represented as the set of components
whose concurrent failure (at time te in Figure 2.1) has initiated the disturbance that is
being examined. In this work component-level operation is considered to be binary (i.e., a
component is either fully functional or has failed altogether). This assumption is justified
where the system representation is fine-grained and the contribution of a single component
to the delivery of an essential service cannot be further decomposed.
An exhaustive examination of failure cases is infeasible for large complex systems.
Alternatively, the omission of failure cases with catastrophic consequences could render
the survivability evaluation meaningless. This state-space explosion problem is common
in any type of system evaluation, but its resolution is not within the scope of this work.
Existing literature on software or system testing [78] can provide inspiration. In this work,
a set of failure cases is assumed to be predefined.
Suppose a system with n components has m failure cases that have been designated
as the basis for survivability evaluation. Each failure case is observed or simulated for a
duration that begins with a fully functional system where all components are operational,
continues through the disturbance caused by failure of the components in F j , and ends when
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recovery efforts are initiated. In other words, observation or simulation of the failure case
defined by F j produces a record of the FoM, M j (t), for t0 ≤ t ≤ td , where t0 and td are as
defined in Figure 2.1. It is worth noting that the failures of the components initiating the
disturbance at te , F j , can lead to failures of other components. This larger set, denoted as
C j , includes any component whose failure is observed between te and td .
Survivability analysis requires that M j (t) be examined in order to determine the
extent and rate of degradation. The full extent of degradation, denoted as δ j , is determined
between the instant of disturbance (te ) and the initiation of recovery (td ). Over the same
period, the most rapid rate of degradation is denoted as ρ j . Equations (2.11) and (2.12)
formalize these attributes.
δ j = max |M j (t0 ) − M j (t)|

(2.11)

dM j (t)
dt

(2.12)

t0 ≤t≤td

ρ j = max

t0 ≤t≤td

The rate and extent of degradation are depicted in Figure 2.8. The survivability of a system
is determined by aggregating the extent and rate of degradation for all failure cases.
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Figure 2.8. Rate and extent of failure depicted on figure-of-merit graph.
For each failure case, a degradation point, (δ j , ρ j ), shown in Figure 2.9, is used
to calculate a degradation index, which is the distance from the degradation point to the
origin. The single degradation point (failure case) shown in Figure 2.9 has a δ of 0.6 and a
ρ of 0.25, which gives it a degradation index, s, of 0.65. The degradation index facilitates
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the comparison of failure cases and can be averaged across all failure cases to determine a
single survivability index for the system.
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Figure 2.9. FoM degradation rate vs. extent histogram and degradation index. Color
indicates the number of failure cases which resulted in the corresponding rate and extent of
degradation. In this instance a single failure case is plotted.
Creating a two-dimensional color intensity histogram of these values for all failure
cases can facilitate identification of clusters of degradation points, which are indicative of
failure cases that are similar in consequence. In an ideal system, only one cluster would be
evident, near the origin in the lower left corner of the plot. This cluster is characterized by
slow and minimal degradation of the system. Clusters outside of this area represent failure
cases that require further investigation, as they demonstrate non-survivable behavior.
2.4.3. Importance Analysis. Evaluation of survivability can illuminate weaknesses
in a system. Specifically, the method presented in this work can facilitate the identification
of components most in need of fortification (i.e., importance analysis), where the measure
of importance is the contribution of a component to survivability. Two criteria for ranking
components are proposed, namely criticality and fragility.
The criticality of a component is determined by the consequences of its failure on
service degradation, which are evaluated over all failure cases in which the component
experiences failure. Associated with each failure case F j is a second set, C j ⊇ F j , that
encompasses all components observed to fail during the failure case. As described in

37
Section 2.4.2, the highest degradation incurred during a given failure case, F j , which is
denoted as δ j . To determine the criticality of the i th component, the failure cases in which
the i th component was observed to fail, must be identified. The set of these cases is
Si = { j | i ∈ C j }. Additionally, let ti, j denote the time at which component i has failed
during failure case F j . The criticality of a component is thus the product of three terms.
The first term, shown in Equation (2.13), normalizes the extent of degradation to
rank the severity of the failure case.

ω1 =

δj
∆

∆ = max δ j
∀j

(2.13)
(2.14)

The second term, shown in Equation (2.15), normalizes the rate of degradation at
the time of component i failure during the failure case.

ω2

dM j (t)
dt t=ti, j
=
dM j (t)
max
∀t
dt

(2.15)

The third term, shown in Equation (2.16), normalizes the second derivative of
the FoM at the time of component failure, which calculates the immediate impact of the
component’s failure on the FoM.

ω3

d 2 M j (t)
dt 2 t=ti, j
=
d 2 M j (t)
max
∀t
dt 2

(2.16)

38
The product is calculated and summed across all failure cases involving component
i and divided by m, the total number of failure cases. The criticality, αi , of component i is
determined as shown in Equation (2.17).

Í
αi =

j∈Si

(ω1 × ω2 × ω3 )
m

(2.17)

If the times of the component failures are not available, another importance analysis
approach looks at the fragility of a component without incorporate survivability. The
fragility of component i, denoted as βi , is the fraction of observed or simulated failure cases
in which the component has failed. The fragility of component i can be determined as
shown in Equation (2.18), where m is the total number of failure cases.

βi =

|Si |
m

(2.18)

Fragility or criticality can be used to determine the priority of a component for
hardening efforts.
2.4.4. Case Study: IEEE Smart Grid Test Systems. In this section, the proposed
approach is demonstrated by applying it to a number of smart grids based on test systems
commonly used in power engineering literature. Specifically, survivability evaluation is
demonstrated for smart grids based on the IEEE 14-, IEEE 30-, and IEEE 57-bus test
systems [79]. The IEEE 14-bus system example has been included in the interest of
providing a concise and clear example. The two larger systems demonstrate the scalability
of the method. All three systems are depicted in Figure 2.10.
The proposed approach to survivability evaluation is intended to be holistic and
applicable to cyber, physical, and cyber-physical systems. To demonstrate this for a cyberphysical system, the classic IEEE test systems were supplemented with cyber infrastructure
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Figure 2.10. Single line diagrams of IEEE smart grid test systems.
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in order to create corresponding smart grids. The cyber infrastructure is comprised of
phasor measurement units (PMUs), which record and communicate GPS time-synchronized
dynamic power system data; flexible AC transmission system (FACTS) devices, which adjust
the flow of power in the transmission lines; and a decision support algorithm that determines
optimal settings for the FACTS devices based on data from the PMUs. The placement of
the PMUs and FACTS devices on each smart grid (shown in Figure 2.10) was determined
using the methods presented in [80] and [81]. The decision support algorithm used was a
neural network trained with N − 1 contingencies.
2.4.4.1. Selection of figure-of-merit. The essential service expected of a smart
grid is the provision of stable power to customers. Two FoMs are used to quantify this
provisioning: the customer service index and the average nominal voltage error. The
customer service index (CSI) reflects the fraction of customers who have received this
essential service, with a binary view — a customer is either served with adequate power
or has not been served at all. In accordance with standards such as EN-50160 [82], the
determination of whether a customer has been served is based on whether the voltage of
the bus to which the customer is connected is within a predetermined range. For example,
EN-50160 specifies a range of 0.9 to 1.1 per unit, where the per-unit representation denotes
normalization by a base value, in this case, a base voltage. Equation (2.19) articulates the
calculation of CSI.

CSI =

Number of customers served
Total number of customers

(2.19)

The second FoM utilized for the evaluation of smart grid survivability is the average
nominal voltage error (ANVE), which calculates the average voltage error over all load
buses that experience undervoltage or overvoltage and subtracts that value from 1, where
an ANVE of 1 indicates full service. Equation (2.20) articulates the calculation of ANVE.
In contrast to CSI, which solely reflects blackouts, ANVE considers brownouts.
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Í
ANVE = 1 −

i

|Rated voltage at bus i − actual voltage at bus i|
(2.20)

Total number of customers

2.4.4.2. Selection of failure cases. As power grids are typically highly reliable
and robust networks, most evaluations rely on N − 1 or N − 2 contingency analyses (i.e., a
single failure or two concurrent failures). In this work, the consequences of an outage of
a transmission line or a power regulator (FACTS device) in the presence of a fault in the
cyber network are analyzed. The cyber faults injected to the smart grid are manifestations
of data corruption: (i) incorrect data from PMUs, (ii) incorrect commands generated by
the decision support algorithm, and (iii) undetected errors in the communications. Note
that any one of these cyber faults alone can be tolerated by the system, however, if they are
accompanied by an outage of a transmission line or failure of a power regulator, further
propagation of the failures is likely. Table 2.3 lists the simulated failure cases and the
number of simulations carried out for each case.
Table 2.3. Summary of faults injected.
single transmission lines
FACTS devices
number of hardware faults simulated
PMU devices
communication links
control units
number of cyber faults simulated
total number of simulation
runs

IEEE-14
20
3

IEEE-30
41
5

IEEE-57
80
7

23

46

87

3
6
1

6
11
1

12
19
1

10

18

32

230

828

2,784

For this study, failure cases were selected based on the failure rate of components.
Failures of transmission lines and FACTS devices were selected because they have a relatively high rate of failure and are a major source of power outages [83, 84]. Additionally,
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failures of PMUs, communication links, and decision support algorithms are included
because their failure would impact the physical components of the system as well.
2.4.4.3. Simulation technique. A smart grid simulator capable of fault injection
is utilized to observe the CSI and ANVE during each failure case. For the electric delivery
system, there are a number of commercial and non-commercial computer simulation tools
available. The PowerWorld Simulator [85] is a popular commercial tool for analysis of high
voltage power systems as it supports common protection and control devices, provides an
interactive environment and intuitive GUI, and is able to solve power flow equations for very
large systems. However, PowerWorld does not provide the transparency needed for analysis
of the sequence of failures. DIgSILENT [86] is another well-known professional tool that
has the same shortcoming. Among the non-commercial packages, MATPOWER [87] and
PSAT [88] are two MATLAB-based toolboxes for Windows machines. MATPOWER can
solve load flow and optimal power flow problems in a command line interface. PSAT has
a graphical interface and supports power regulators and basic monitoring and protection
devices in addition to the capabilities of MATPOWER. In this work, PSAT is used for the
simulation of the three IEEE bus systems. For the purpose of fault injection simulations,
PSAT was enhanced in order to achieve the high resolution required for the analysis of smart
grids. These enhancements include incorporating wide-area measurement capabilities by
PMU devices, providing a platform for implementing a decision support algorithm, and
integrating the power systems with communication technologies that are used in smart grid
applications. This modified version of PSAT is interfaced with a MATLAB wrapper that
acts as an adapter between libraries and orchestrates subroutine calls.
This simulation environment is used to determine power flows and voltages in
the network during the failure cases. Figure 2.11 illustrates the procedure followed for
simulating each failure case. In each outer loop, a data file that contains the topology of
the system under test is loaded and a failure case (with index j) is executed at time te by
injecting the corresponding faults and/or failures. In the inner loop, at each time step, PSAT
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performs power flow analysis and determines active power flow on each line and voltage
at each bus. PMU devices then measure phasor data (including active power and voltage)
of corresponding lines and buses and send that data to the decision support algorithm
where new settings for FACTS devices are calculated. Updated settings will regulate active
and reactive power flow in the lines where FACTS devices are installed. At this point,
PSAT power flow analysis is run once more to find the updated active power flows and bus
voltages. In every iteration of the inner loop after instant te , active power flow of the lines
are compared to their capacity. If any line is overloaded, it is considered failed, and the
topology is updated accordingly.
The simulation continues until no further failures are detected. For the sake of
consistency among the three IEEE bus systems and for the ease of comparing the plots, all
simulations are continued for 25 time steps (denoted as t f inal in Figure 2.11). However, all
failure sequences terminate before the 25th time step.
Note that since the time is discrete and is determined by the software simulation
tool, the rate of degradation is limited to a maximum value. Additionally, minor changes in
the rate of degradation due to time-specific variations may not be captured in the simulation
environment.
2.4.4.4. Simulation results. Figure 2.12 depicts the simulation results for each of
the three test systems, using CSI and ANVE as the FoMs. In Figure 2.12, each sub-figure
depicts the change in one FoM over time after the injection of a failure. The intensity of
the line indicates the number of failure cases in which the FoM demonstrated this behavior.
Note that since CSI is discrete, it can only hold a finite set of values between 0 and 1.
These results indicate that the majority of the simulated failure cases result in
minimal degradation, as the test systems are relatively robust. In the IEEE-14 smart grid
results, shown in Figure 2.12a and 2.12b, a number of failures lead to total system failure
with no customers served and a maximum error for CSI and ANVE, respectively (this
is indicated by the FoMs reaching 0). Additionally, the results indicate that the initial
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j=1

Import IEEE bus system topology file

t=0

PSAT performs power flow analysis

PMU devices send phasor data to the control algorithm

Control algorithm calculates settings of the FACTS devices

PSAT performs power flow analysis
Compute Mj(t) in terms of CSI and ANVE indices

Affect outage of
overloaded lines

Yes

Any overloaded lines?
No
t = t + Δt

Execute jth failure
case

Yes

t = te ?
No
t > tfinal ?

No

Yes
Compute δj and ρj

j=j+1

j>m?

No

Yes
End

Figure 2.11. Survivability evaluation procedure.

degradation of both CSI and ANVE for a number of failure cases is delayed by multiple
time steps. Lastly, the results show that a number of failure cases have two phases of system
degradation separated by a brief period of stabilization. The IEEE-30 and -57 smart grids
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(a) CSI vs. time for IEEE-14

(b) ANVE vs. time for IEEE-14

(c) CSI vs. time for IEEE-30

(d) ANVE vs. time for IEEE-30

(e) CSI vs. time for IEEE-57

(f) ANVE vs. time for IEEE-57

Figure 2.12. CSI and ANVE vs. time. The desired outcome is a value of 1 characterized
by all customers being served and no voltage error for all customers, respectively, for CSI
and ANVE.
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incorporate more redundancy and can tolerate a greater number of failures, this is seen in
Figure 2.12c, 2.12d, 2.12e, and 2.12f, where the FoMs never reach 0.
2.4.4.5. Survivable behavior evaluation. The maximum rate and extent of degradation were extracted from the log of each failure case.

Figure 2.13 depicts a two-

dimensional histogram of CSI and ANVE for each smart grid simulated.
In an ideal system, every one of these histograms would be dense near the origin
and sparse elsewhere, reflecting slow and minimal degradation in response to failure. This
expectation is realized for the IEEE smart grids evaluated. However, there are clusters of
failure cases with higher rates and extents of failure which fall in the upper and/or right
regions of the histogram. The presence of these clusters indicates that many of the failure
cases have similar values of rates and extents of degradation. This is most likely caused by
similar failure propagation paths through the power grid (i.e., different cascading failures
involve the same vulnerable components).
2.4.4.6. Importance analysis. The importance analysis technique is used to identify survivability bottlenecks and guide investments toward fortifying these systems. Criticality and fragility can be determined for each component of a grid, as described in
Section 2.4.3.
Table 2.4. Transmission lines of IEEE 57-bus system with highest fragility and criticality.
Only the top ten lines are shown.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Line
l4−18
l1−2
l3−4
l1−15
l1−17
l4−6
l8−9
l1−16
l6−7
l2−3

Fragility (×10)
0.2801
0.2729
0.2514
0.2370
0.2370
0.2227
0.2227
0.2227
0.2155
0.1939

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Line
l8−9
l4−18
l3−4
l6−7
l4−6
l1−2
l1−15
l13−15
l1−16
l2−3

Criticality (×102 )
0.1477
0.1417
0.1337
0.1277
0.1137
0.1078
0.1058
0.0718
0.0659
0.0639
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(c) CSI degradation rate vs. extent histogram for
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(f) ANVE degradation rate vs. extent histogram
for IEEE-57

Figure 2.13. CSI and ANVE degradation rate vs. extent histogram. Color indicates the
number of failure cases which resulted in the corresponding rate and extent of degradation.
The desired outcome for both CSI and ANVE is a single cluster near the origin characterized
by slow and minimal degradation of the FoM.
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Table 2.4 shows the rankings of the top ten lines of IEEE 57-bus system using
fragility and criticality as criteria for hardening prioritization. It can be seen that some lines
have similar ranking in both (e.g., lines l4−18 , l3−4 , and l4−6 ). However, a few lines have
much higher priority when using criticality as the metric, such as lines l8−9 and l6−7 . These
lines fail in fewer failure cases but have a very high impact on the system FoM when they do
fail. Alternatively, a few lines have a much lower priority using criticality as a metric, such
as lines l1−2 and l1−15 . These lines fail as a result of another more important line failing,
but their failure is relatively insignificant in terms of system survivability.
2.4.4.7. Validation of approach. In this section, importance analysis technique is
validated through the targeted hardening of an IEEE 57-bus smart grid. To harden the smart
grid system, the five lines with highest priority metrics were fortified by increasing their
power flow capacity by 50%, which is expected to increase the survivability of the system
because it increases fault tolerance. The same hardening effect could have been achieved by
adding redundant lines; however, this was avoided in order to maintain the topology of the
system for ease of comparison. Once the system was hardened, the survivability analysis
was rerun to compare the results with the original system.
First, fragility was used to select components for hardening. Lines l4−18 , l1−2 , l3−4 ,
l1−15 , and l1−17 , highlighted in yellow in Figure 2.14, were hardened. Next, criticality was
used to select components for hardening. Lines l8−9 , l4−18 , l3−4 , l6−7 , and l4−6 , highlighted
in blue in Figure 2.14, were hardened. Results of simulations are compared for original and
hardened versions of IEEE-57 in Figure 2.15. The survivability results shown in Figure 2.16
verify the effectiveness of the hardening technique.
Comparing the survivability evaluation results of the two hardened and original IEEE
57-bus smart grids demonstrates an improvement in the survivable behavior of the system.
Both importance analysis techniques resulted in an improvement in system survivability
evident as is in Figure 2.15. However, using criticality as the metric leads to a more
effective improvement over the original system.
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Figure 2.14. IEEE 57-bus smart grid test system. Lines highlighted in yellow have the
highest fragility and those highlighted in blue have the highest criticality.

2.4.5. Summary of Research Contribution. The research contribution presented
in Section 2.4 is an approach for evaluation of survivability for CPSs with arbitrary, fixed,
and known topologies. This approach evaluates the survivability of a system by extracting
the rate and extent of degradation of a domain-specific FoM during the observation or
simulation of multiple failure cases. The results of the observation or simulation are used
in importance analysis to identify critical components whose hardening would be most
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(a) CSI vs. time for original IEEE-57

(b) ANVE vs. time for original IEEE-57

(c) CSI vs. time for IEEE-57 hardened based on
fragility

(d) ANVE vs. time for IEEE-57 hardened based
on fragility

(e) CSI vs. time for IEEE-57 hardened based on
criticality

(f) ANVE vs. time for IEEE-57 hardened based
on criticality

Figure 2.15. CSI and ANVE vs. time for hardened systems. Comparison of the FoM graphs
for original IEEE-57, the IEEE-57 hardened based on fragility, and the IEEE-57 hardened
based on criticality. Extent of degradations has reduced for the hardened systems.
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Figure 2.16. CSI and ANVE degradation rate vs. extent histogram. Comparison of the
CSI and ANVE degradation rate vs. extent histograms for original IEEE-57, the IEEE-57
hardened based on fragility, and the IEEE-57 hardened based on criticality. Clusters of
degradation points have moved towards the origin for the hardened systems.
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beneficial to survivability. This technique was demonstrated using three smart grids based
on conventional IEEE power test systems.
Future work will incorporate the simultaneous use of multiple FoMs to create a
multi-dimensional FoM utilizing Pareto optimality. Additionally, the scalability of this
approach will be improved by examining a more strategic selection of failure cases using
superposition for evaluating systems with independent components.
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3. MODELING AND EVALUATION OF CPS BEHAVIOR

The survivability evaluation approach described in Section 2.4 requires on observing
system behavior after catastrophic events to determine if a system will continue to provide
essential services. This observation can be conducted using a real system, a system simulator
or using a system behavior model. There are a number of reasons a system behavior model
would be preferred, including cost and time constraints. Behavior models are very domain
specific and require an understanding of the various physical properties inherent to the type
of CPS.

3.1. INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION AND AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) are CPSs aimed at improving performance
and safety of transportation networks [89]. ITS refers to all modes of transport including
road, rail, and air. All of these transportation systems have similar challenges [1]. However,
road transportation systems are used as an example system in this work. All following
references to ITS will refer to road transportation systems.
ITS technologies include everything from basic traffic management systems such as
vehicle navigation and traffic signal control to more advanced systems that allow Vehicle
to Everything (V2X) communication to improve control and information dissemination
between vehicles, roadside units, infrastructure, pedestrians, and cyclists [90]. ITS technologies also include unmanned vehicle technologies including self-driving vehicles and
automatic parking systems. The example ITS system used in this work focuses on Infrastructure to Vehicle (I2V), Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V), and Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I)
communication as well as information dissemination and the intelligent traffic control that
communication facilitates [91].
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These services can be classified based on where in the infrastructure the required
computer processing occurs. Elements of ITS infrastructure can be classified as mobile
infrastructure or static infrastructure.
3.1.1. Mobile Infrastructure. Mobile infrastructure consists of all ITS elements
without a static network connection (i.e., vehicles). Vehicles on modern roadways range
from classic cars with no digital systems to fully autonomous, unmanned vehicles. ITS
systems must be designed to accommodate the full range of vehicles. Vehicles can be
categorize based on their communication capability and level of automation.
Traditional vehicles are all vehicles without V2V or V2I communication capability.
They do not provide data directly to the ITS. Vehicles in this category may or may not
have I2V capabilities which would provide the driver with additional information about
congestion, such as 2-way GPS traffic updates. This category also includes vehicles with
adaptive cruises control or advanced collision avoidance systems such as blind spot sensors
and backup sensors. While these technologies improve vehicle safety and control, they do
not provide data to other components in an ITS.
Intelligent vehicles are vehicles with V2V or V2I communication capability that are
controlled by a human driver. These vehicles are equipped with an onboard sensor suite
with the capability to monitor the locations and actions of surrounding vehicles as well as
detect road obstacles and conditions. These vehicles utilize on-board processing and storage
systems to analyze collected data. Collected information is communicated to surrounding
vehicles or the ITS infrastructure via roadside unit. The wireless communications capability
falls into two categories based on the indented recipient. Short-range communication is
used to communicate with neighboring vehicles and roadside units using the IEEE 802.11p
protocol, which was specifically developed for ITS and mobile ad hoc or mesh networking.
The second type of communication is longer range communications using IEEE 802.16,
WiMAX, GSM, or 3G. This type of communication is used to communicate with a central
traffic management center or to access other relevant data sources.

55
Unmanned vehicles are vehicles with the same capabilities as intelligent vehicles.
However, the collected data is used to directly control the vehicle rather than to assist a
human driver. In addition, collected data may be provided to other components of an ITS.
3.1.2. Static Infrastructure. Static infrastructure within ITS includes purely physical infrastructure including roads, highways, and bridges as well as the static, cyberenhanced infrastructure. The static ITS infrastructure does not move during operation and
includes devices such as traffic signals and road sensors.
The cyber layer of an ITS system is structured and functions similar to a sensor
database architecture. Sensor database architectures are classified based on where the data
is stored. These architectures range from traditional sensor databases, where data is stored
in a centralized database, to distributed databases, where every sensor node has its own
database.
Traditional sensor networks described by Akyildiz et al. [92] are not applicable
to ITS due to large networking overhead and delay. Another sensor network architecture
is the distributed sensor database system, which places databases closer to the controller
and sensor nodes. This architecture can be thought of as a data logging network. In
this type of sensor network, all sensors send all sensed data to secondary storage, which
can be retrieved in bulk. This architecture permits duplication of stored data to improve
performance. Distributed database architectures are not specific to sensor networks. Many
approaches to distributed databases are summarized by Hurson et al. [93] including federated
and multi-databases which address issues such as data distribution and transparency as well
as query and transaction processing. A further distributed sensor network architecture is
discussed by Bonnet et al. [94] is the sensor database model. In this architecture, each
sensor node holds a database that can be dynamically queried. Tsiftes et al. [95] discuss
this sensor network architecture and propose a database management system.
A practical ITS would use a combination of distributed and sensor database architectures at various hierarchical levels of the system. Combining these architectures may
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improve performance by limiting the communication of raw data, energy, bandwidth, and
scalability. Additionally, this architecture improves maintainability and fault recovery by
storing performance data at the sensor nodes. Amadeo et al. [90] discuss the benefits of
using a Named Data Networking model for ITS, which would require this type of database
architecture. However, this architecture has challenges including the system updates and
database management due to its distributed nature.
3.1.2.1. Road side units. A Road Side Unit (RSU) collects traffic data from a static
sensing area along a road and transmits data to traffic control devices as well as a Central
Traffic Management center. These devices also serve as an information source for intelligent
vehicles to collect future traffic information [96].
RSU can sense traffic information using a number of methods. One method for
collecting traffic information is the triangulation method. Triangulation uses mobile phones
as anonymous traffic probes. The phones transmit presence announcement signals to the
mobile phone network which can be observed by an RSU. This network data is collected
and analyzed using triangulation and converted into traffic flow information. This method
works for all types of vehicles, provided that a powered-on mobile phone is in the vehicle.
Another method is vehicle re-identification. This method uses some unique identification
from an in-vehicle device, such as Bluetooth MAC addresses or a RFID toll tags. As a
vehicle travels along a route, multiple RSU detects a specific vehicle and record a time
stamp. This information is shared and analyzed to determine speed, travel times, and traffic
flow for a road segment. This method requires technology within the vehicle to transmit
a unique id. Conveniently, most modern vehicles use wireless communication between
components, which can be used to identify a vehicle. Lastly, V2I communication provided
by intelligent vehicles can be used to collect traffic flow data. Many other techniques can
be used to collect traffic flow data such as two-way GPS or satellite navigation systems,
inductive loop detection, traffic video cameras, and audio detection.

57
RSU use information from multiple sources to create an accurate picture of traffic
flow on a specific road segment by using data fusion based approaches to intelligently
combine data. These data fusion techniques create a more accurate representation of the
traffic than any single sensing method.
3.1.2.2. Traffic control. ITS allows for traffic control systems that are more advanced than traditional timed traffic signals [97]. One type of control device is intelligent
traffic lights, which use traffic data collected at the local intersection, as well as future
traffic information provided by RSUs, to create a dynamic time schedule to maximize the
flow of traffic through an intersection. Another control system is variable speed limits.
These systems work to minimize traffic density in congested areas by dynamically changing
the speed limit of roads based on weather conditions, road conditions, or the presence of
congestion areas. Lastly, dynamic lanes can be used to provide more inbound or outbound
lanes depending on the flow of traffic as traffic in many metropolitan areas is not symmetric.
3.1.2.3. Central traffic management. A Central Traffic Management (CTM) system could be centralized or distributed over a control area. In either case, a CTM collects
and analyzes data from intelligent vehicles, unmanned vehicles, and RSU to facilitate control decisions [98]. Each central traffic management office would have a server for data
storage and processing. The processed data could be used for high-level coordination of
the traffic control devices. The central office could then broadcast data back to vehicles to
improve navigation and control.

3.2. MODELING AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE BEHAVIOR
The past decade has seen autonomous vehicles become the subject of considerable
research and development activity with test vehicles already on the road. The majority of
these advances have focused on individual vehicles, rather than the interactions that result
when autonomous (unmanned) and conventional (manned) vehicles come together in an
intelligent transportation system. The robustness of autonomous vehicles to contingencies
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caused by unpredictable human behavior is a critical safety concern. Assuring the reliability,
availability, security, and similar non-functional attributes of autonomous vehicles are just
as critical. While many traffic models exist, no existing models incorporate manned and
autonomous vehicles.
The research project proposed in this work centers on developing models capable of
accurately representing environments where manned and unmanned vehicles coexist. This
work proposes extending an established macroscopic transportation model to differentiate
between manned and autonomous vehicles. Differentiating vehicles allows for the use of
stochastic methods to reflect the non-determinism of the operating environment, especially
as related to driver behavior. The goal of this research is to capture both basic operation
of autonomous vehicles, as well as advanced capabilities such as platooning and robotic
adaptation. The insights gained from these models will facilitate the design of intelligent
transportation systems that are both safe and efficient. This work was published in [6].
3.2.1. Traffic Models. Traffic can be modeled at various levels of abstraction. The
state of a traffic system is given by the number of vehicles present in a section of the
transportation network at a given time. The most basic models are microscopic discreteevent models such as those in [99, 100, 101, 102, 103], which accurately describe traffic
behavior at intersections or a single stretch of road or highway. When the roads are highly
populated, these models suffer from state explosion, making analysis difficult. These models
are useful for the design of individual intersections and roads and have been expanded to
reflect human behavior.
Macroscopic models overcome this state expansion by disregarding individual vehicles. They use only three variables to describe local behavior: density, average speed, and
flow rate [104]. Many macroscopic models are described in [105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110,
111].
Many of these models utilize Petri nets for synchronous system evaluation. Petri
nets represent a powerful modeling formalism that has been successfully used in different
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application domains. A Petri net consists of places, transitions, arcs, and tokens. Arcs
serve as connections between places and transitions and tokens represent some aspect of
the system - in this case vehicles in a traffic system. Places hold the tokens until they are
passed via an arc through a transition based on a set of firing rules. Many different types of
Petri nets have been developed and tailored to model specific applications.
3.2.2. Traffic Model for Autonomous Vehicle Operation. This proposed traffic
model for autonomous vehicle operation is built upon the model described in [104]. In
the original model, the traffic system is modeled as a hybrid Petri net, with road sections
modeled as continuous transitions and stop lights and intersections modeled as discrete
transitions. Hybrid Petri nets allow for modeling both the continuous and discrete elements
of a system while preventing the state space explosion that would result from a purely
discrete model.
Roads are represented as a series of virtually-divided road sections that are described
by the density d(t) of cars at time t, their average speed v(t), and the flow f (t). The marking
m(t) of a place represents the number of cars present at time t, uniformly distributed along
the length of the road section with an average speed v(t). The modeled road sections have
three different modes of operation, depending on the traffic conditions (i.e., the density of
vehicles). If a section has low density, vehicles will travel at the free speed (free flow), where
outflow increases proportionally to the density. When the density is higher, the average
speed will decrease, but the outflow will remain constant (constant flow). And lastly, when
the density is very high, the outflow decreases due to congestion.
The Continuous Petri net model of a single road section is shown in Figure 3.1. It
has three places (p1, p2, p3 ) and two transitions (ti−1, ti ). The number of cars in a section
is the marking of p1 . The flow of vehicles entering and leaving a section is dictated by
ti−1 and ti , respectively. Free-flow traffic is modeled by ignoring p2 and p3 . Constant-flow
traffic is modeled using p3 , which has a constant marking and imposes an upper bound on
the flow of ti . Lastly, when the density reaches the maximum, as a road section can hold
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a finite number of vehicles, p2 is used to ensure m[p1 ] + m[p2 ] capacity of road section.
The marking at p2 represents the number of gaps in the section. To model a road, multiple
sections are connected with transitions.

Figure 3.1. Single Road Section Model (from [104]).
Traffic lights are modeled as discrete events that can take one of three values: red,
amber, or green. Each traffic light is modeled as a four-phase system, each represented by
a place. The phases for an intersection of two roads R1 and R2 would be:
1. Phase 1: Green light for R1 and Red light for R2 .
2. Phase 2: Amber to Red light for R1 and Red light for R2 .
3. Phase 3: Red light for R1 and Green light for R2 .
4. Phase 4: Red light for R1 and Amber to Red light for R2 .
Phases 1 and 3 are when traffic is flowing on one of the two roads and phases 2 and
4 are the safety periods used to clear the intersection. This discrete Petri net has only one
marking, so the system can be in only one state, with each phase being active when the
corresponding place is marked. The road sections are joined to the intersection as follows.
The flow through the intersection at any time is calculated by multiplying the flow of the
continuous transition by the average velocity of the section. The velocity is dictated by the
phase. The flow for R1 during phase 1 is the same as the flow would be if there were no
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traffic light. During phase 2, the flow decreases linearly to 0 and remains at 0 for phases 3
and 4.
Extending the Hybrid Petri net model developed by [104] to become a Colored
Hybrid Petri net provides the mechanism to distinguish colors of tokens (i.e., types of
vehicles). Distinguishing types of vehicles allows for transition firing rates dependent on
the saturation of vehicle type at a location in the system. The extended model would be used
to first build a city-level traffic model for analysis of traffic patterns as well as the study of
failure in active transportation control systems. Specifically, the effect of intelligent traffic
lights and dynamic speed limits on fault propagation from a single faulty controller across
an urban traffic network will be studied.
This project was abandoned due to limitations in available data and validation. The
pace of development in autonomous vehicles and the proprietary nature of the associated
research prevented the continuation of this research. Without real traffic data from a system
with manned and unmanned vehicles, validation will be impossible.
3.2.3. Summary of Research Contribution. The main contribution of the proposed model in Section 3.2 is a model for the behavior of manned and autonomous vehicles
in an intelligent (urban) transportation system. The proposed model has the potential to contribute to better understanding the behavior of autonomous vehicles, which will be crucial
in designing future transportation infrastructure systems that are both safe and efficient.

3.3. DATA CORRUPTION IN CPSS
The operation and behavior of CPSs are heavily dependent on the accuracy of
the data processed by the control system. A functional control system which processes
corrupted data will produce incorrect control settings. Data corruption is the unintended
change to data that occur during writing, reading, storage, transmission, or processing. It
can be created within a system through unintentional means, such as failures in sensors,
processors, storage, or communication hardware, or through intentional means such as an
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attack. Data corruption can manifest as missing or erroneous information. Both types of
data corrupting can have negative effects on CPS operation and performance, however, these
effects can be minimized by using a data cleansing process. Data cleansing is the process
of detecting and mitigating corrupted data to ensure proper system operation.
Depending on the architecture of the cyber infrastructure, a CPS may have one or
multiple control entities which received data created by sensors throughout the network.
Additionally, data is exchanged between control entities in distributed control systems. This
creates the potential for corrupted data to enter the control system and propagate to other
control entities. Understanding the extent to which the corruption can propagate is essential
designing fault tolerant and reliable systems.
The following sections provide an overview of the sources of data corruption, as
well as corruption detection and mitigation techniques suitable for CPSs. These key topics
are essential to understanding how undetected corrupted data can propagate through a CPS
and are essential to designing robust CPS. This work was published in [8] and extended
in [9].
3.3.1. Sources of Corrupted Data. An understanding of fault tolerance and dependability is necessary in order to discuss data corruption. Aviźienis et al. [13] define
failure, error, and fault to describe the state of a system in the presence of a disruptive event
based on the system’s ability to provide its specified service. A system failure occurs when
the system does not comply with its specifications. An error is a system state that may cause
a subsequent failure (i.e., a failure occurs when an error alters a service). And lastly, a fault
is the adjudged cause of an error. Faults can be classified based on a number of factors,
including persistence, activity, and intent. Therefore, data corruption can be classified as a
failure, error, or fault, depending on its location in the system. Creation of corrupted data
by a sensor is a failure; a system processing corrupted data is a system error; receipt of
corrupted data as a system input is a fault. Therefore, in a networked system, corrupted data
can be a classified as a fault, error, or failure.
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Corrupted data can be created within a system in a number of different ways, both
deliberate and non-deliberate. Deliberate data corruption is the result of an attack. Attacks
can be classified as cyber, physical, or cyber-physical [112]. All three types of attacks have
the potential to result in data corruption. As an example, consider a smart meter utilized in
the smart grid. A cyber attack such as altering the software of a smart meter could cause the
sensor to report erroneous consumption information. Alternatively, a physical attack such
as physically bypassing the smart meter would result in the sensor not reading the correct
consumption information and result in incorrect information reported. Similarly, a cyberphysical attack such as combining the above cyber and physical attacks could be employed
to disguise the presence of meter bypassing by altering the smart meter’s software.
Non-deliberate data corruption is the result of corruption during communication,
processing, or storage, or could be due to inaccurate sensor readings [113]. Erroneous
sensor readings can be caused by quantizing errors reading a noisy signal. Other errors can
be introduced by external conditions or sensor aging. Re-calibrating a sensor can reduce
these errors, but cannot prevent them. Additionally, data may be incomplete, due to periodic
failures of sensors. Cebula et al. [114] provide a detailed taxonomy of related cyber and
physical risks.
3.3.2. Detection of Corrupted Data. As stated in Section 3.3.1, corrupted data
can be produced by a number of sources including miscalibrated or faulty sensor hardware
and errors in processing, storage, and communication. In many large distributed systems
the cause or source of corrupted data is difficult to determine, however, the same data
cleansing techniques may be used regardless of the source of the data error. Corrupted
data can be detected by locating anomalies in the system. Rajasegarar et al. [115] discuss
the importance and challenges of anomaly detection in sensor networks as it pertains to
fault diagnosis, intrusion detection, and monitoring applications. The main challenge in
anomaly detection algorithm development is that sensor networks are highly application and
domain dependent. Two domain specific techniques are proposed by Yin et al. [116] who
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model wind turbine data and Freeman et al. [117] who model aircraft pilot-static probe data.
Both of these examples propose anomaly detection techniques for data with a nonlinear and
unknown distribution and significant measurement noise. However, these techniques are
not suitable for other domains and do not scale to CPSs. Another challenge in anomaly
detection for CPS is sensor node storage and processing limitations. Anomaly detection
that does not hinder normal operation must be employed. Corrupted data is detected and
mitigated while the data is still viable with minimal energy consumption.
3.3.2.1. Statistical detection. Corrupted data can be detected by locating data
anomalies or statistical irregularities in the data. While faulty sensors typically report
easily distinguishable extreme or unrealistic values, not all data anomalies are the result of
data corruption. Extreme environmental variations can produce data anomalies that must
be distinguished from corruption.
Jurdak et al. [118] classify data anomalies into three broad categories: temporal,
spatial, and spatiotemporal. Temporal data anomalies are local to one node and can be
detected by observing sensor values over time that have one of the following attributes:
high variability in subsequent sensor readings, lack of change in sensor readings, gradual
reading skews, or out-of-bound readings. Examples of failures that result in this type of
anomaly are as follows. A sensor may fail into a locked state or fail to obtain new samples
making the sensor reading remain the same over long periods of time. As a sensor loses
calibration, its data values drift away from the true value. A major malfunction of the
sensor could produce out-of-bound readings that are physically not possible. And lastly,
high variability in sensor readings could arise from sensor voltage fluctuations but could also
signify major changes in the sensed environment. The detection process requires the data
stream from a single node as well as stored historical data. The process can be conducted
locally at the node, provided the node is cable of storage and processing, or by a centralized
process on either a sink node or a base station.
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Spatial data anomalies occur when one sensor’s data readings are significantly
different from surrounding nodes’ readings. Detecting this type of anomaly requires a
network-aware algorithm and is thus usually performed by a sink node or base station.
Data redundancy between sensors is exploited to determine which sensors may have faulty
readings. This type of detection is only possible for certain types of data with low spatial
variation, such as air temperature or humidity. In this type of data, a change in one area will
affect the surrounding sensors’ readings. Networks with high spatial variation, especially
video and audio data, are usually incapable of detecting such anomalies.
Spatio-temporal anomalies combine attributes of both temporal and spatial anomalies. These anomalies are somewhat rare but also more difficult to detect. For example,
a storm progressively moving through an area causing sensor nodes to fail would be a
spatiotemporal anomaly. As with spatial anomalies, spatiotemporal anomalies require a
network-wide detection algorithm.
A variety of techniques are employed to detect each of these classes of data anomaly.
Statistical approaches assume or estimate some statistical distribution model which captures
the distribution of the data and detect anomalies by checking how well the data fits the
model. Statistical approaches can be further classified as rule-based, estimation-based, or
learning-based. Zhang et al. [119], Chandola et al. [120] and Fang et al. [121] provide
comprehensive overviews of statistical anomaly detection techniques. Below is a summary
of these approaches and recent advances in anomaly detection and a discussion of their
applicability to CPSs.
Rule-based statistical approaches are the simplest form of anomaly detection. An
acceptable lower and upper limit for the data is set and any value outside of this range is
an anomaly. This technique requires only the definition of an outlier to be set, making it
inflexible and resulting in many false positives or undetected anomalies if the tolerance is
set too low or high. The benefits of this technique are that it is fast, requires no additional
storage capability, and can be implemented in few lines of code making it ideal for sensor
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nodes. Another simple rule-based statistical approach to anomaly detection is statistical
inference using the mean and variance of a data set. Ngai et al. [122] use a chi-square test
performed over a sliding window. In this example, the system determines that at least one
value in the sliding window is anomalous if the chi-square value falls outside of some range
specified by the user. The acceptable level must be configured prior to operation. This
node-local approach can detect temporal type anomalies of a single sensor while imposing
no additional network overhead. However, each sensor will require more storage, depending
on the window size, and processing power to carry out the statistical analysis. Statistical
inference techniques cannot adapt to changing ranges, which are very common in longterm wireless sensor network installations. Panda et al. [123] propose another very simple
rule-based statistical anomaly detection method which calculates the mean and variance of
a set of neighboring sensors to determine if a sensor is faulty. This approach can detect
spatial anomalies in a set of neighboring sensors. Rule-based statistical methods can be
implemented on minimal hardware and detect anomalies very quickly provided the data
is well behaved and the rules are set appropriately. As such, other approaches have been
developed that do not rely on user-set parameters.
Estimation-based statistical approaches use probability distribution models of the
data to detect anomalous values. Probability distribution models can be parametric or nonparametric based [119]. Parametric models assume knowledge of the data distribution (i.e.,
Gaussian-based model). Non-parametric models such as histograms and kernel density
estimators, do not assume knowledge of the data distribution. Histogram models estimate
the probability of data occurrences by counting the frequency of occurrence and detect
anomalies by comparing the new data with each of the categories in the histogram. Kernel
density estimators estimate the probability distribution function (pdf) for some normal data.
An anomaly is detected if new data lies in the low probability region of the pdf. Fang et
al. [124] propose an energy efficient detection method using an ARIMA model. The ARIMA
model is a statistical model used time series analysis. It has three terms, auto-regression
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(AR), integration (I), and moving average (MA) to represent the data. The auto-regression
term compares the new value to historical data using linear regression. The integration
term differences the original data series to make the process stationary. And the moving
average term captures the influence of extreme values. Each sensor node maintains a matrix
of all maximum and minimum differences between itself and its neighbors. Then, using a
voting mechanism, values are marked as valid or erroneous. Estimation-based approaches
are mathematically proven to detect anomalies if a correct probability distribution model is
used. However, knowledge of the probability distribution is not available in many real-world
applications, making non-parametric approaches more useful. However, these approaches
require additional hardware and storage but execute very quickly to detect anomalies.
Learning-based statistical approaches utilize data mining clustering and classification algorithms to group data with similar behaviors [121]. An anomaly is detected when
data does not belong to a group. These techniques have very high detection rates but require
additional processing and storage hardware.
A decentralized clustering approach to anomaly detection is set forth by Rajasegarar
et al. [125]. This approach was designed specifically for hierarchical (tree-based) networks.
Leaf nodes take sensor readings and cluster them into fixed-width clusters. Each nonleaf node in the tree takes clusters from its children and merges them together. Anomaly
detection is performed at the root node by finding clusters that are further away from other
clusters by more than one standard deviation above the average cluster distance. Chang
et al. [126] use an Echo State Network (ESN), a neural network in which all neurons are
connected to each other, to perform anomaly detection. The ESNs are trained before the
nodes are deployed, so they are not very flexible. They operate in a similar fashion to
Bayesian networks where the sensor’s value is compared to the value predicted by the
ESN. The advantage of using a neural net, in this case, is that it has much lower CPU
and RAM requirements than a Bayesian network. An improvement to this approach is put
forth by Obst [127]. Instead of building recurrent neural networks beforehand, each node
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communicates with its immediate neighbors to build a model of its sensors’ values. This
model is then used to estimate anomalies in the readings.
Classification approaches use a learned model to organize data into a class; in this
case, normal or anomalous. One classification approach uses Bayesian networks to model
sensor values and predict when values are anomalous. [121] Mayfield et al. [128] have
developed a tool called ERACER that uses Relational Dependency Networks to correct
anomalous data and fill in missing data. The tool runs on the base station and develops
linear models of sensor data, taking into account readings from other sensors at that node
and readings from neighbor nodes. Another example of Bayesian networks is [129], where
the concentration of various gasses in a mine’s atmosphere is monitored. The network
models sensor values over time as well as physical relationships between sensors. The
system learns a baseline for the mine’s concentrations that adapts to the natural fluctuations
in gas concentration. It can detect both single-sensor anomalies and multi-node anomalies
and events.
Ni et al. [130] propose using a hierarchical Bayesian space-time model to detect
trustworthy sensors. The disadvantage of this technique is the amount of work required to
set up the model. This technique results in excellent anomaly detection if model accurately
represents the data. However, as with all models, if the model is poorly matched to the data
the system performance degrades. A more advanced classification approach is the nearest
neighbor approach. This approach uses a distance metric, for example, Euclidean distance,
to determine how similar a value is to its neighbors. An anomaly is detected if the distance
between neighbors is more than a user specified threshold. Expanding on this approach,
Branch et al. [131] use a distributed algorithm to detect outliers as data propagates through
the sensor network. In this approach, each node maintains a set of outlier data points from
itself and its neighbors. A ranking function is used to map data values to non-negative real
numbers which indicate the degree to which the data value can be regarded as an outlier
with respect to the dataset. Nodes transmit data they suspect will cause the outlier set of
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their neighbors to change. This is similar to a distributed k-nearest-neighbors classification
approach. This technique is flexible with respect to the outlier definition, allowing for
dynamic updating and in-network detection, reducing bandwidth and energy consumption.
A method to improve the performance of learning-based approaches uses principal
component analysis (PCA) to reduce the dimensionality of a data. PCA is a technique that
uses spectral decomposition to find normal behavior in a data set. PCA is used to reduce
dimensionality before detection by finding a subset of data which captures the behavior of
the data, allowing for the detection of temporal, spatial, and spatiotemporal data anomalies.
Chitradevi et al. [132] proposes a two-step algorithm. First, a PCA model is built that
can be used for fault detection. Second, the Mahalanobis distance is used to determine
the similarity between the current sensor readings against the developed sensor data model.
However, conventional PCA approaches are sensitive to data anomaly frequency in collected
data and fail to detect slow and long-duration anomalies. Xie et al. [133] addresses this
problem by using a multi-scale principal component analysis (MSPCA) to detect anomalies
and extract and interpret information. MSPCA uses both wavelet analysis and principal
component analysis. The time-frequency information of the data is captured using wavelet
analysis while principal component analysis is used to detect data anomalies. This technique
allows for detecting gradual and persistent anomalies with different time-frequency features.
Lastly, a hybrid approach is proposed by Warriachet al. [134] to detect data anomalies
based on the three methods. By combining rule-based methods, estimation-based, and
learning-based methods, they are able to leverage domain and expert knowledge, sensor
spatial and temporal correlations and inferred models for the faulty sensor readings using
training data. This approach has the benefits of the above approaches but also requires more
processing capability and power at sensor nodes.
One major issue in CPS data corruption detection is determining when anomalous
data is erroneous. Tang et al. [135] investigates the trustworthiness of sensor data and
propose a method called Tru-Alarm to eliminate false alarms by filtering out the noise and
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false information. Tru-Alarm is able to estimate the source of alarm by constructing an
alarm graph and conducting trustworthiness inference based on the graph links.
3.3.2.2. Behavioral detection. Behavioral approaches have also been implemented
to detect the anomalous behavior of a system rather than the data produced. Many of these
approaches are part of intrusion detection systems (IDS). Liao et al. [136] provide a comprehensive overview of IDS approaches for general computing, classifying them as signaturebased detection, anomaly-based detection, and stateful protocol analysis. Signature-based
detection, also known as knowledge-based detection, detects a pattern or string that corresponds to a known attack. This technique is limited to detecting known attacks. Anomalybased detection determines the normal behavior of the system and detects anomalies by
comparing the current behavior with the normal behavior model. Anomaly-based detection
can monitor any type of activity, including network connections, number and type of system
calls, failed login attempts, processor usage, the number of e-mails sent, etc. This approach
can detect both known and unknown attacks. Lastly, stateful protocol analysis, also known
as specification-based detection, compares a vendor-developed profile of specific protocols
to current behavior. An example would be monitoring protocol states such as pairing requests and replies. Modi et al. [137] provide a survey of IDS techniques used for cloud
computing. Many of the approaches use techniques similar to statistical anomaly detection, as well as neural networks and fuzzy logic. While some of these techniques are very
computationally intensive, they can be implemented on sensor nodes without hindering the
real-time access to data.
CPS specific IDS approaches have also been developed. Buttán et al. [138] discuss the WSAN4CIP Project which investigated a number of attack detection methods to
determine if a sensor node is compromised. The project included intrusion detection and
prevention techniques that were adapted to the wireless environment. A micro-kernel in the
sensor node operating system supports multiple levels of security and determines if the code
deployed on a sensor node is unchanged. Mitchell et al. [139] provide a detailed review of
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CPS related IDS research. In addition to IDS, for traditional networked computing systems,
CPS IDS monitors both the embedded components and the physical environment, which
under attack may exhibit abnormal properties and behavior. However, this is complicated
by legacy technology still used in many CPS. Some legacy components are based on mechanical or hydraulic control with no cyber component, making them difficult to modify
or access. Thus CPS IDS must define acceptable component behavior based on sensor
readings of the physical environment.
3.3.3. Mitigated of Corrupted Data. Detected erroneous or missing data can be
mitigated in a number of ways depending on the criticality and valid time interval of the
data. Mitigation can be accomplished by correcting, replacing or ignoring the corrupted
data. In many CPS applications, the useful life of a single piece of data is very short making
some correction or replacement techniques inappropriate. Additionally, many correction
techniques require a great deal of computation making the energy consumption prohibitive.
However, in other applications corrupted data minimizes the quality of information and
ignoring these errors may cause a serious effect in data analysis. Gantayat et al. [140]
provide a review of research on missing or incomplete data. A variety of techniques are
used to generate predicted values. Many of these approaches are very similar to the anomaly
detection techniques. The following are approaches for mitigating missing and corrupted
data:
• Imputation: This technique replaces missing data values with an estimation based on
the data stream’s probabilistic model.
• Predicted Value Imputation: This technique replaces missing data with estimated
values based on the data set. The estimation methods vary in complexity from mean
or mode values to more complex estimates from training data.
• Distribution Based Imputation: This technique replaces missing data using a classification algorithm. A set of pseudo-instances is created when a missing value is
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encountered. Each pseudo-instance is tested. The replacement value is selected using
a weighted comparison.
• Unique Value Imputation: This technique replaces the missing value using simple
substitution from historic information.
• Replacing Missing Data: This technique replaces the missing data with a value from
a test case that resembles the current data set.
• Rough Sets: This technique uses lower and upper approximations to determine a
replacement value. The benefit of this technique is that there is no need for preliminary
or additional information about the data. A number of extensions to rough set
have been proposed including tolerance relation, non-symmetric relation, and valued
tolerance relation.
• Similarity Relation: This technique replaces the missing data after making generalized
decisions based on the entire data set.
Each of these mitigation techniques can be deployed on the sensor nodes of a CPS
depending on the storage and processing limitations of the sensor node. These techniques
can be employed to replace corrupted or missing data allowing for correct execution.
In some higher level data cleansing activities, multiple cleansing alternatives are
available on a system. In this case, automatic data cleansing requires a set of policies
to determine the appropriate option. Mezzanzanica et al. [141] present a model-based
approach for developing a policy for the data cleansing of a data set. In some cases, data
cleansing requires a domain expert to be involved in the data cleansing effort. Gschwandtner
et al. [142] presents an interactive visual analysis tool called TimeCleanser. This system is
designed for data cleansing of time-oriented data. TimeCleanser combines semi-automatic
data quality checks and data visualizations to assist the user.
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3.3.4. Effects of Corrupted Data. Ayatolahi et al. [143] experimentally studies the
effects of single and double bit errors in an instruction set architecture registers and main
memory using fault injection. Fault injection is a method to test and assess the dependability
(availability, reliability, and maintainability) and performance of fault-tolerant and fail-safe
systems. One of its uses is benchmarking the error sensitivity of a system when it experiences
hardware faults in the processor or main memory. To measure the error sensitivity, bit-flip
errors are injected in the main memory and Instruction Set Architecture registers. The
experiment consisted of nine campaigns of the single bit-flip and double bit-flip models
each with 12,000 trial runs on 13 test programs. Each run was categorized as one of the
following categories:
• No Impact: The program terminates normally and the error does not affect the output
of the program.
• Hardware Exception: The processor detects an error by raising a hardware exception.
• Timeout: The program fails to terminate within a predefined time.
• Silent Data Corruption: The program terminates normally, but the output is erroneous
and there is no indication of failure.
This experiment demonstrates the error sensitivity of different registers and memory
locations. Their results showed that the most common effect of both single and double-bit
errors is a hardware exception, with double-bit errors resulting in more than single-bit.
Both single and double-bit errors produced corrupted results roughly 30% of the time.
Timeout errors were rarely encountered. Overall double-bit errors more impact on results.
Obviously, the error sensitivity varies depending on bit positions, registers and the software
tested. This study was conducted on a diverse set of programs, with various implementation
sizes, input types and sizes, and functionalities. While none of the programs tested were
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CPS control systems, the results give estimates of the probability of correct incomplete, or
corrupted results based on corrupted input.
In an attempt to improve a program’s sensitivity to corrupted data, Sangchoolie
et al. [144] study the impact of compiler optimizations on various programs. The study
provides insight into the impact of different levels of GNU Compiler Collection compiler
optimizations (-O1, -O2, -O3, -Os) on the corrupted data sensitivity of programs using
twelve benchmark programs. These optimizations can be used to improve the performance
of the compiled program. However, the results of the experiment show that the data
corruption sensitivity of the optimized programs is only marginally lower than the nonoptimized programs.

3.4. MODELING THE PROPAGATION OF CORRUPTED DATA
Despite the considerable body of work on areas such as data flow and failure
propagation, no models have been specifically developed to capture the propagation of
corrupted data and resulting state in a networked system. Therefore, no existing work
can be used for direct comparison to this project. The closest related work is presented
in [145], which attempts to quantify the dependency between electrical and information
infrastructure by evaluating the impact of missing data as a result of an attack. However,
it does not capture the potential for propagation of erroneous or missing data. The studies
most relevant to the research presented in this paper are on the topics of data corruption and
data cleansing.
In order to develop a model to capture the propagation of corrupted data between
nodes in a CPS, a qualitative model was created to understand the data cleansing process
and the potential for propagation. The qualitative model was used as the foundation for a
quantitative Petri net model. The Petri net model abstracts the data storage, processing, and
communication of a CPS. This model is intended to facilitate analysis of failures caused by
data corruption. The abstraction allows the analysis to focus on information exchange and
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Figure 3.2. Overview of survivability evaluation process.

eliminates the need for simulation of the physical infrastructure of a CPS. The state of the
system is quantified in terms of the percentage of system data that remains uncorrupted.
Thus, the model enables analysis of data dependencies and facilitates survivability evaluation of a system in the presence of cyber faults producing corrupted data. This process is
shown in Figure 3.2. The utility of the model is illustrated by application to an example
monitoring system. This work was published in [12].
3.4.1. Qualitative Model for Propagation of Data Corruption. The qualitative
model for the propagation of corrupted data between sensor/actuator nodes of a CPS is
shown in Figure 3.3. This qualitative model focuses on the information processing steps of
a single node in the network and determines if corrupted data results in corrupted control
data and the propagation of corrupted data to neighboring nodes.
Initially, corrupted data enters the node from local sensors, neighboring nodes,
or local storage causing a node fault. The corrupted data can be either erroneous or
missing. Next, the corruption detection technique is employed. If corrupted data is
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Figure 3.3. Qualitative model of the propagation of corrupted data in a CPS. Initially
corrupted data enters a node; after the cleansing process the results in either a functional
system of corrupted output data.

detected, mitigation is attempted. If the mitigation is successful, the node has recovered
and regular execution takes place. If the corrupted data is not detected or mitigation fails,
the node processes the corrupted data causing a node error. If processing of corrupt data
results in correct output data, then the corruption has no impact on system operation. If the
processing results in a hardware exception or timeout, then corrupted data is introduced in
the form of missing data. However, if the processing results in an erroneous output, then
silent data corruption occurs, introducing corrupted data in the form of an erroneous output.
The propagation of corrupted data in the system may be limited if the corruption is detected
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by the neighbors of a node. However, understanding the extent to which the corruption has
propagated is essential for designing fault-tolerant and reliable systems.
3.4.2. Quantitative Model for Propagation of Data Corruption. The quantitative model, which is based on the qualitative model, is in the form of a colored stochastic
discrete time Petri net (CDTSPN) [146, 147]. A basic Petri net is N = (P, T, A, M0 ), where P
and T are disjoint finite sets of places and transitions, respectively, A is a set of arcs such that
A =⊂ (P × T) ∪ (T × P), and M0 is the initial marking M0 = [p1 = 1, p2 = 0, . . . pn = 1] dictating the number of tokens in each place at time t0 . CDTSPNs are stochastic place/transition
nets used in system modeling and consist of four primary components: transitions (signified by bars), places (signified by circles), arcs (signified by arrows), and colored tokens
(signified by dots). Color provides the ability to distinguish among tokens. The Petri net
is discrete-time stochastic due to the non-deterministic firing of transitions, which in the
model represent data creation, transmission, and cleansing behaviors.
Formally a CDTSPN is defined as N = (P, T, A, C, E, G, ρ, M0 ), where P is a set of
places, T is a set of transitions, A is a set of pre- and post-arcs, C is a color set function that
maps each place to the set of possible token colors, E is a set of arc expression functions
defined on A, G is a set of guard functions defined on T, ρ is the set of nonzero conditional
probabilities for the geometrically distributed firing times defined on T, and M0 is the initial
marking of the net.
The model is constructed based on the system’s specifications and logical topology
of the cyber infrastructure of the networked system or CPS. The system specifications
dictate the failure rates of each component in the system (e.g., sensor’s probability of error
or probability of communication channel failure). These probabilities dictate the firing rates
in ρ. Each system node is modeled as a set of places and transitions which abstract the
information exchange process including the sources of corrupted data and the data cleansing
process performed at the node.
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The model of a single sensor/actuator node in a networked system is depicted in
Figure 3.4. The model consists of three data places (input, detected, and database), four
transitions (sensor, detect, mitigate, process) for node execution, and multiple transitions
(input/output channels) for communication between the nodes. The tokens represent discrete
data elements in the modeled system. The token color set, C, corresponds to the three states
defined for a data element (i.e., correct shown in green, erroneous shown in red, or missing,
shown in blue). The state of the system is determined by the marking, M of the CSPN
(i.e., the respective number of correct, erroneous, or missing data elements within each
database), of the model after information is exchanged.
Output Channel
Input Channel
Process

Database

Mitigate

Detected

Input
Detect
Sensor

Figure 3.4. Petri net model of a single node of a CPS. Multiple nodes are connected via
input/output transitions to model a CPS.
The information exchange process models the flow of data from data sources through
the data cleansing process to the database of the sensor/actuator node.
3.4.2.1. Sources of data corruption. The primary sources of data corruption in a
CPS are sensors, communication channels, and storage and processing hardware. Each of
these sources is represented using transitions in the Petri net model.
Sensors located at a sensor/actuator node of a CPS are modeled with the sensor
transition. The sensor transition fires to create a new data token that is deposited in the
input place. The firing rate of this transition is determined by the probability of producing
corrupted data (i.e., the probabilities of the sensor producing an erroneous reading or not
reporting a sensor reading). The sensor transition firing rates are shown in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1. Probability of firing for sensor transition.
Produced Data
Erroneous
Missing
Correct

Pcorr

Probability
Perr
Pmiss
= 1 − Perr − Pmiss

Consequence
Sensor reports an erroneous reading
Sensor fails to report reading
Sensor functions correctly

Before Transmission of Data

Node 1 DB

Channel Corruption

Node 2 DB

Channel Corruption

Node 3 Input

After Transmission of Data

Node 1 DB

Channel Corruption

Node 2 DB

Channel Corruption

Node 3 Input

Figure 3.5. Petri net model of single direction data communication. Node 3 has two
neighbors, Node 1 and Node 2, which transmit data for control purposes.

The channel transitions model the data corruption caused by communication channels between nodes of the CPS. These transitions connect the database place of neighboring
nodes to the input place of the node as shown in Figure 3.5. In this case, Node 3 has two
neighbors, Node 1 and Node 2, which transmit data for control purposes.
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Each direction of a communication channel is modeled as a separate transition. The
channel transition fires by copying one data token from the sending node’s database and
altering or discarding it in transit. The firing rate of this transition is determined by the
probability of the channel corrupting data in transit either by dropping or altering a data
element. The channel transition firing rates are shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2. Probability of firing for communication transition.
Sent Data
Correct
Erroneous
Missing

Received Data
Missing
Erroneous
Correct
Missing
Erroneous
Missing

Pcorr

Probability
Pmiss
Perr
= 1 − Perr − Pmiss
Pmiss
1 − Pmiss
1

Consequence
Correct data is dropped in transit
Correct data is altered in transit
Data arrives correctly
Erroneous data is dropped in transit
Erroneous data is sent altered resulting in erroneous data being received
No data is sent so no data is received

The process transitions model the data corruption caused by the data processing and
storage at a node in the CPS. This transition is a self-loop with the database place. This
transition fires with every data element in the database and alters or discards the element
based on the hardware specifications. The process transition firing rates are shown in
Table 3.3.
Table 3.3. Probability of firing for process transition.
Processed Data
Correct
Erroneous
Missing

Result Data
Missing
Erroneous
Correct
Missing
Erroneous
Missing

Pcorr

Probability
Pmiss
Perr
= 1 − Perr − Pmiss
Pmiss
1 − Pmiss
1

Consequence
Correct Data is lost of as a result of storage and processing
Correct Data is altered of as a result of storage and processing
Data is correctly stored and processed
Erroneous data is lost of as a result of storage and processing
Erroneous data is still erroneous as a result of storage and processing
No data is processed or stored

3.4.2.2. Data cleansing process. The detect and mitigate transitions and the intermediate detected place model the data cleansing process employed at a node in the CPS. The
input place contains data newly arrived at the node that is to be added to a node’s database.
The cleansing process executes the following steps on data in the order it is received.
First, the detection process flags data as being corrupted. If the detection process
is independent of the data currently stored in the database, the transition utilizes static
probabilities of detection, Ptruepositive , and false positives, P f alsepositive . The detection
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process can detect or falsely detect corrupted data elements. The detection transition firing
rates are shown in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4. Probability of firing for detection transition.
Input
Correct
Erroneous
Missing

Detection
Flagged
Not Flagged
Flagged
Not Flagged

Probability
P f alsepositive
Ptruenegative = 1 − P f alsepositive
Ptruepositive
P f alsenegative = 1 − Ptruepositive
1

Consequence
Incorrectly flagged data by detection process
Correct behavior
Correct behavior
Undetected Erroneous data
Missing data is always flagged as missing.

However, if the probability of detection is dependent on the accuracy of the historical
data stored in the node’s database, an additional Petri net structure is used, as shown in
Figure 3.6. In this case, the detection probabilities will change depending on the amount of
correct and corrupted data in the database. The transitions fire changing the cleanser state
when the percent of corruption in the database passes some system specified threshold. The
database state is used as an additional firing condition in the detection transition to change
the probabilities of detection.
In both the static or state-based detection process, the detection transition fires,
moving the data token from the Input place and either detected place if the token is believed
to be corrupted, or the Database place if it is not.
Second, the mitigation process attempts to correct the data that has been flagged
as corrupted. Similar to the detection process, the mitigation process can be independent
of the data currently stored in the database or utilize historic data. The mitigation process
can replace the token with a correct token, P f ix , replace the token with a missing token,
Pdiscar d , thereby functionally discarding the data element, or it can replace the token with
an erroneous token, P f ix f ailure , if the mitigation is unable to repair the corruption. The
mitigation transition firing rates are shown in Table 3.5.
The mitigate transition fires, moving the data tokens from the detected place, altering
them based on the probabilities in Table 3.5, and placing them in the database place. The
mitigation process corrects or discards corrupted data; however, if a correct token is falsely
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High Cleansing Probability

High Prob

Low Prob

Failed

Node DB

Low Cleansing Probability

High Prob

Low Prob

Failed

Node DB

Figure 3.6. Petri net structure for non-static detection probabilities.
Table 3.5. Probability of firing for mitigation transition.
Input
Correct
Erroneous

Missing

Mitigation
Discard (Missing)
Mitigate Failed (Erroneous)
Mitigate (Correct)
Discard (Missing)
Mitigation Failed (Erroneous)
Mitigate (Correct)
Discard (Missing)
Mitigation Failed (Erroneous)

Probability
Pdiscar d
P f ix f ailure = 1 − Pdiscar d
P f ix
Pdiscar d
P f ix f ailure = 1 − P f ix − Pdiscar d
P f ix
Pdiscar d
P f ix f ailure = 1 − P f ix − Pdiscar d

Consequence
Incorrectly flagged data is discarded by mitigation process
Incorrectly flagged data is altered by mitigation process
Erroneous data is corrected or replaced by suitable data
System aware that replacement data is not accurate
System unable to correct or replace erroneous data
Mitigation able to replace with correct data
System aware that replacement model is not accurate
System unable to correct or replace erroneous data

detected as corrupted it will either be corrupted (by unnecessary mitigation) or discarded
by the mitigation process. This can be the source of data corruption in a system.
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In this model, the size of the databases is finite, which implies that as data elements
are added to the database, older or unused elements will be removed. To accomplish this,
the detect and mitigate transitions remove a random data token from the database place
when a new data token is added. Tokens are chosen at random because data tokens in
the database place are assumed to be aggregated information rather than individual sensor
readings.
3.4.2.3. Simulation of model. The model is executed over time and the marking
(number of correct, missing, and erroneous data tokens in each database place of the Petri
net) is logged after each time step. Each time step represents the reading of sensors and
exchange of information between nodes in the CPS. During each time step, each sensor
creates a data element and all nodes exchange data elements via communication channels.
The model is simulated synchronously at each time step by first firing all sensor and channel
transitions, then firing the detection and mitigation transitions for each node, and finally
firing the process transition. If data cleansing is dependent on the state of the data in the
database, then cleanser state is updated by firing the enabled transitions.
This simulation process shows the effect of transient failures that cause data corruption. A transient failure is a temporary failure such as a packet being corrupted during
transit across a wireless link. This is a transient failure because the transmission of one
packet failed but the channel is still functional. In order to evaluate failure cases involving persistent failures that cause data corruption, the transition probabilities are altered.
A persistent failure is a permanent failure requiring repair, such as a cut fiber optic cable. A persistent sensor failure in which the sensor produces erroneous readings would
be (Perr = 1, Pmiss = 0, Pcorr = 0). Alternatively, a persistent sensor failure in which the
sensor fails to produce a reading would be (Perr = 0, Pmiss = 1, Pcorr = 0).
The node execution is as follows:
1. The sensor and channel transitions fire and create data tokens in the input place.
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2. The detection transitions fire, moving the data tokens from the input place to either
the detected place or the database place.
3. The mitigate transition fires, moving the data tokens from the detected place, changing
the state of the data token, and placing it in the database place.
4. The process transitions fire, replacing tokens in the database and altering the token’s
state to simulate corruption that occurs during processing and storage.
5. (If dependent cleansing) the cleanser state is updated.
3.4.3. Case Study: IEEE-57 Bus Smart Grid. In this section, the proposed approach is demonstrated by applying it to a smart grid based on a test system commonly
used in power engineering. Specifically, the model for the propagation of corrupted data
and survivability analysis technique are demonstrated using a smart grid based on the IEEE
57-bus test system [79]. The IEEE test system was supplemented with cyber infrastructure
to create a smart grid. The cyber infrastructure was comprised of phasor measurement
units (PMUs), which record and communicate dynamic power system data; flexible AC
transmission system (FACTS) devices, which adjust the flow of power in the transmission
lines, communication channels; and a four-zone distributed decision support system that
determines optimal settings for the FACTS devices based on data provided by the PMUs,
FACTs devices and generators. The methods presented in [80] and [81] were applied to
determine where to place the PMUs and FACTS devices on the smart grid and utilized the
four-zone distributed control zones presented in [148], shown in Figure 3.7. The distribution
of components across the zones is shown in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6. Distribution of components across zones.
Zone
1
2
3
4

# of Buses
24
8
10
15

# of Generators
2
2
1
2

# of PMUs
3
2
3
4

# of FACTS
3
0
1
3

# of Loads
24
7
9
12
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Zone 2

Zone 1

...
Zone 4

Zone 3

Generator
Load
Bus
PMU Device
FACTS Device

Figure 3.7. Single line diagrams of IEEE 57-bus smart grid test system.

The cyber infrastructure of each control zone is a database and processor that
collects data from all of the data-generating components within the zone (i.e., generators,
FACTS devices, and PMUs). Additionally, control zones exchange control information
with neighboring zones that share a physical border. The logical topology of the cyber
infrastructure is shown in Figure 3.8.
3.4.3.1. Experiment description and failure cases. The essential service expected of the cyber infrastructure of a smart grid is to collect and process data as a part
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Zone 2

Zone 1

Zone 4

Zone 3

Figure 3.8. Logical topology of IEEE 57-bus smart grid test system.

of the decision support provided to the power system. Therefore, the FoM is defined as
the percentage of correct data in all of the control zone databases. This reflects the overall
quality of information being processed by the decision support algorithm. For this study,
the consequences of the failure of a single data-generating element were analyzed and the
survivability improvement of employing data cleansing systems on each control zone was
determined.
The following parameters were used for the various cyber infrastructure components.
The probabilities of producing an erroneous or missing data element by the data generating
components are as follows: generators Perr = 0.001 and Pmiss = 0.001, FACTS devices
Pmiss = 0.002 and Perr = 0.002, PMUs Pmiss = 0.01 and Perr = 0.01. The probabilities of
altering or dropping data by the communication channels is Perr = 0.001 and Pmiss = 0.03,
respectively. The data processing altered or lost the data with a probability of Perr = 0.0001
and Pmiss = 0.0001, respectively. The parameters of the evaluated data cleansing system
are a detection system with a true positive and false positive of Ptruepositive = 0.95 and
P f alsepositive = 0.001, respectively, and a mitigation system with a probability of correcting
the data of P f ix = 0.5 and a probability of discarding the data of Pdiscar d = 0.25.
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The model was constructed and simulated using the SNAKES Petri net tool [149].
The results were averaged over 1000 simulations of each test case. The failure case was
injected at t = 200, and the simulation continued until no further failures were detected. For
the sake of consistency among the three IEEE bus systems and ease of comparing the plots,
all simulations were continued for 400 time steps. In all tests, all nodes were initialized
with no corrupted or missing data.
3.4.3.2. Results and survivability analysis. Figure 3.9 depicts the simulation results without any persistent component failures for the system without data cleansing capability (Figure 3.9a) and with data cleansing capability (Figure 3.9b). The desired outcome
is a value of 100 characterized by the system having no corrupted data. However, in both
systems, erroneous data exists as a result of transient failures of the sensors. The percentage
of missing data is the system is high due to the high probability of dropped data elements
by the communication channels.
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Figure 3.9. Correct data vs. time for IEEE 57-bus smart grid with failure event.
Figure 3.10 depicts the simulation results for each of the test systems using the
percentage of corrupted data in the system as the FoM. These results indicate that while no
failure case resulted in a catastrophic degradation in the FoM, all failure cases impacted the
quality of information processed by the system. However, the results indicate a significant
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improvement in the FoM as a result of utilizing data cleansing capability in the cyber
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Figure 3.10. Correct data vs. time for IEEE 57-bus smart grid with failure event.
The maximum rate and extent of degradation were extracted from the log of each
failure case. Figure 3.11 depicts a two-dimensional histogram of the two systems simulated.
In an ideal system, these histograms would be dense near the origin and sparse elsewhere,
reflecting slow and minimal degradation in response to failure. However, there are clusters
of failure cases with higher rates and extents of failure that fall in the upper and/or right
regions of the histogram. The presence of these clusters indicates that many of the failure
cases have similar values of rates and extents of degradation. When comparing the two
systems, there is an obvious improvement in survivable behavior as a result of deploying
data cleansing capabilities.
Averaging the degradation index (Cartesian distance from a degradation point,
(δ j , ρ j )) for each failure case produces the survivability indices of the system without
cleansing capability of 0.1259 and with cleansing capability of 0.0501, showing a significant
improvement in survivable behavior.
3.4.4. Summary of Research Contribution. The research contribution presented
in Section 3.4 is a novel model to analyze the propagation of corrupted data in the cyber
infrastructure of a CPS. This model abstracts data processing, communication, and cleansing
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Figure 3.11. Color indicates the number of failure cases which resulted in the corresponding
rate and extent of degradation. The desired outcome is a single cluster near the origin
characterized by slow and minimal degradation of the FoM.

in a networked system and produces a figure-of-merit over time in response to a failure case.
These results are used for survivability analysis. This model and associated survivability
analysis technique were demonstrated using the cyber infrastructure of a smart grid based on
conventional IEEE power test systems. Future work will extend the data cleansing process
of the model to study more complex cleansing techniques. Additionally, an analytical model
for the propagation of corrupt data will be development based on the Petri net model.
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

The goal of the research presented in this dissertation is to illuminate data dependencies and interdependencies in CPSs and to quantitatively capture the effect of these
dependencies by modeling the propagation of corrupted data. I have presented a number of
metrics and models for the analysis of CPS with respect to dependability attributes, with a
specific focus on survivability.
First, I demonstrated a model of system-level reliability for critical infrastructure
CPSs, where reliability is determined as a function of the respective reliabilities of the
control system and cyber infrastructure. This was demonstrated with a case study using an
intelligent water distribution network. Future directions of this work are exploring additional
fault states for various cyber and physical components, to represent more realistic behavior
of the system; and to include degraded systems states to analyze the water distribution
network from a survivability perspective.
Second, I justified the use of survivability as a metric for the evaluation of CPSs and
presented an approach for evaluating survivability. This approach can be used to evaluate
the survivability of any complex, networked system during a disruptive event, by observing
the extent and rate of degradation of a domain-specific figure-of-merit. This evaluation
approach facilitates targeted hardening of CPSs by prioritizing components based on their
fragility and criticality. The entire approach, from evaluation to hardening, are demonstrated
with a case study using smart grid systems. Future directions of this work are to improve
the scalability of the approach by refining the selection of failure cases and investigating
and the use of superposition for evaluating systems with independent components.
Third, I proposed a behavioral model for intelligent transportation systems that
combine legacy (primarily manned) vehicles with their more modern semi- and fullyautonomous counterparts. The understanding gained from this model will be useful in
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mitigating the results of failure, leading to increased safety. The next step for this research
is validation on a testbed that allows for concurrent operation of vehicles with varying levels
of autonomy. Given the emergence of driverless vehicles as a very active research area, this
validation is expected to become feasible in the very near future.
Lastly, I presented qualitative and quantitative models for the propagation of corrupted data in CPSs. Qualitative modeling served as a precursor to quantitative modeling, by
providing an understanding of the potential for the propagation of corrupted data as a result
of information exchange between control entities of a CPS. The quantitative model measures
the state of data in a system as information is exchanged and can be used in conjunction with
survivability evaluation by enabling the use of correct (vs. corrupt or missing) data as a
figure-of-merit. This application is illustrated with a case study on a smart grid based on the
IEEE 57-bus test system. The propagation model abstracts information exchange in a CPS.
It can be refined by considering domain-specific aspects of the physical infrastructure and
cyber-physical interdependency that could facilitate (or complicate) detection or mitigation
of data corruption.

92
BIBLIOGRAPHY

[1] R. Rajkumar, I. Lee, L. Sha, and J. Stankovic, “Cyber-physical systems: The next
computing revolution,” in Proceedings of the 47th ACM/IEEE Design Automation
Conference (DAC), pp. 731 –736, June 2010.
[2] P. Derler, E. Lee, and A. Vincentelli, “Modeling cyber-physical systems,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 100, no. 1, pp. 13–28, 2012.
[3] A. A. Kirilenko and A. W. Lo, “Moore’s law versus Murphy’s law: Algorithmic
trading and its discontents,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, pp. 51–72, 2013.
[4] B. Miller and D. Rowe, “A survey of SCADA and critical infrastructure incidents,”
in Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Research in Information Technology,
pp. 51–56, 2012.
[5] E. S. Agency, “Schiaparelli landing investigation completed.” http:
//www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Science/ExoMars/Schiaparelli_landing_
investigation_completed. Accessed: 2017-05-02.
[6] M. Woodard and S. Sedigh Sarvestani, “Modeling of autonomous vehicle operation in
intelligent transportation systems,” in Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop
on Software Engineering for Resilient Systems, pp. 133–140, 2013.
[7] K. Marashi, M. Woodard, S. Sedigh Sarvestani, and A. R. Hurson, “Quantitative
reliability analysis for intelligent water distribution networks,” in Proceedings of
the Embedded Topical Meeting on Risk Management for Complex Socio-Technical
Systems, Annual Meeting of the American Nuclear Society, November 2013.
[8] M. Woodard, S. Sedigh Sarvestani, and A. R. Hurson, “A survey of research on data
corruption in cyber-physical critical infrastructure systems,” vol. 98 of Advances in
Computers, pp. 59–87, Elsevier, 2015.
[9] M. Woodard, M. Wisely, and S. Sedigh Sarvestani, “A survey of data cleansing
techniques for cyber-physical critical infrastructure systems,” vol. 102 of Advances
in Computers, pp. 63–110, Elsevier, 2016.
[10] M. Woodard, K. Marashi, and S. Sedigh Sarvestani, “Survivability evaluation and importance analysis for complex networked systems,” Submitted to IEEE Transactions
on Network Science and Management, 2017.
[11] N. Jarus, M. Woodard, K. Marashi, S. Sedigh Sarvestani, J. Lin, A. Faza, and P. Maheshwari, “Survey on modeling and design of cyber-physical systems,” Submitted to
ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems, 2017.

93
[12] M. Woodard, S. Sedigh Sarvestani, and A. R. Hurson, “A Petri-net model for propagation of corrupted data in a networked system,” In Preparation for Reliability
Engineering & System Safety, 2017.
[13] A. Avizienis, J.-C. Laprie, B. Randell, and C. Landwehr, “Basic concepts and taxonomy of dependable and secure computing,” IEEE Transactions on Dependable and
Secure Computing, vol. 1, pp. 11–33, January 2004.
[14] B. Parhami, “A multi-level view of dependable computing,” Computers & Electrical
Engineering, vol. 20, pp. 347–368, July 1994.
[15] The International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee, “ITU-T recommendation E.800. Quality of telecommunication services: Concepts, models,
objectives and dependability planning. Terms and definitions related to the quality
of telecommunication services,” September 2008.
[16] W. S. Lee, D. L. Grosh, F. A. Tillman, and C. H. Lie, “Fault tree analysis, methods,
and applications: A review,” IEEE Transactions on Reliability, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 194–
203, 1985.
[17] R. E. Barlow, J. B. Fussell, and N. D. Singpurwalla, Reliability and fault tree analysis,
vol. 33. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 1975.
[18] M. Malhotra and K. S. Trivedi, “Power-hierarchy of dependability-model types,”
IEEE Transactions on Reliability, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 493–502, 1994.
[19] M. Modarres, M. Kaminskiy, and V. Krivtsov, Reliability Engineering and Risk
Analysis: A Practical Guide. CRC Press, August 1999.
[20] R. G. Bennetts, “Analysis of reliability block diagrams by Boolean techniques,” IEEE
Transactions on Reliability, vol. R-31, pp. 159–166, June 1982.
[21] H. Ohlef, W. Binroth, and R. Haboush, “Statistical model for a failure mode and
effects analysis and its application to computer fault-tracing,” IEEE Transactions on
Reliability, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 16–22, 1978.
[22] S. Chadjiconstantinidis and M. V. Koutras, “Measures of component importance for
Markov chain imbeddable reliability structures,” Naval Research Logistics, vol. 46,
no. 6, pp. 613–639, 1999.
[23] M. V. Boutsikas and M. V. Koutras, “Reliability approximation for Markov chain
imbeddable systems,” Methodology and Computing in Applied Probability, vol. 2,
no. 4, pp. 393–411, 2000.
[24] M. Malhotra and K. Trivedi, “Dependability modeling using Petri nets,” IEEE Transactions on Reliability, vol. 44, pp. 428–440, September 1995.
[25] R. Zeng, Y. Jiang, C. Lin, and X. Shen, “Dependability analysis of control center
networks in smart grid using stochastic Petri nets,” IEEE Transactions on Parallel
and Distributed Systems, vol. 23, no. 9, pp. 1721–1730, 2012.

94
[26] Y. Katsigiannis, P. Georgilakis, and G. Tsinarakis, “A novel colored fluid stochastic
Petri net simulation model for reliability evaluation of wind/PV/diesel small isolated power systems,” IEEE Transactions onSystems, Man and Cybernetics, Part A:
Systems and Humans, vol. 40, pp. 1296–1309, November 2010.
[27] A. Faza, S. Sedigh, and B. McMillin, “Reliability analysis for the advanced electric
power grid: From cyber control and communication to physical manifestations of
failure,” in Proceedings of the 28th International Conference on Computer Safety,
Reliability and Security, vol. 5775 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 257–
269, Springer, September 2009.
[28] T. Dasic and B. Djordjevic, “Method for water distribution systems reliability evaluation,” in Proceedings of the 2nd Biennial Meeting of the International Environmental
Modeling & Software Society, 2004.
[29] H. Jun, G. V. Loganathan, A. K. Deb, W. Grayman, and J. Snyder, “Valve distribution and impact analysis in water distribution systems,” Journal of Environmental
Engineering, vol. 133, pp. 790–799, August 2007.
[30] B. C. Ezell, J. V. Farr, and I. Wiese, “Infrastructure risk analysis model,” Journal of
Infrastructure Systems, vol. 6, pp. 114–117, September 2000.
[31] J. Wagner, U. Shamir, and D. Marks, “Water distribution reliability: Analytical
methods,” Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management, vol. 114, no. 3,
pp. 253–275, 1988.
[32] R. Gupta and P. Bhave, “Reliability analysis of water distribution systems,” Journal
of Environmental Engineering, vol. 120, no. 2, pp. 447–461, 1994.
[33] L. W. Mays, “Review of reliability analysis of water distribution systems,” in Proceedings of the 7th International Association for Hydro-Environment Engineering
and Research International Symposium, pp. 53–60, July 1996.
[34] A. Torii and R. Lopez, “Reliability analysis of water distribution networks using the
adaptive response surface approach,” Journal of Hydraulic Engineering, vol. 138,
no. 3, pp. 227–236, 2012.
[35] S. Rinaldi, “Modeling and simulating critical infrastructures and their interdependencies,” in Proceedings of the 37th Annual Hawaii International Conference on
Systems Sciences (HICSS), 2004.
[36] P. Pederson, D. Dudenhoeffer, S. Hartley, and M. Permann, “Critical infrastructure
and interdependency modeling: A survey of US and international research,” tech.
rep., Idaho National Laboratory, August 2006.
[37] W. Kuo and M. Zuo, Optimal Reliability Modeling: Principles and Applications.
Wiley, 2003.

95
[38] V. Singh, S. Jain, and A. Tyagi, Risk and Reliability Analysis: A Handbook for Civil
and Environmental Engineers. ASCE Press/American Society of Civil Engineers,
2007.
[39] United States Environmental Protection Agency, “EPANET2 User’s manual.” http:
//www.nepis.epa.gov/Adobe/PDF/P1007WWU.PDF. Accessed: 2017-05-02.
[40] J. Lin, S. Sedigh, and A. Hurson, “Ontologies and decision support for failure
mitigation in intelligent water distribution networks,” in Proceedings of the 45th
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, January 2012.
[41] J. Lin, S. Sedigh, and A. Miller, “Towards integrated simulation of cyber-physical
systems: A case study on intelligent water distribution,” in Proceedings of the 8th
IEEE International Conference on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing,
pp. 690–695, 2009.
[42] J. F. Meyer, “On evaluating the performability of degradable computing systems,”
IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 100, no. 8, pp. 720–731, 1980.
[43] B. Iyer, L. Donatiello, and P. Heidelberger, “Analysis of performability for stochastic models of fault-tolerant systems,” IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. C-35,
pp. 902–907, October 1986.
[44] R. Smith, K. Trivedi, and A. Ramesh, “Performability analysis: measures, an algorithm, and a case study,” IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 37, pp. 406–417,
April 1988.
[45] G. Ciardo, R. A. Marie, B. Sericola, and K. S. Trivedi, “Performability analysis
using semi-Markov reward processes,” IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 39,
pp. 1251–1264, October 1990.
[46] D. Henry and J. E. Ramirez-Marquez, “Generic metrics and quantitative approaches
for system resilience as a function of time,” Reliability Engineering & System Safety,
vol. 99, pp. 114 – 122, 2012.
[47] S. Hosseini, K. Barker, and J. E. Ramirez-Marquez, “A review of definitions and
measures of system resilience,” Reliability Engineering & System Safety, vol. 145,
pp. 47 – 61, 2016.
[48] M. Ouyang and L. Duenas-Osorio, “Time-dependent resilience assessment and improvement of urban infrastructure systems,” Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of
Nonlinear Science, vol. 22, no. 3, 2012.
[49] K. Barker, J. E. Ramirez-Marquez, and C. M. Rocco, “Resilience-based network
component importance measures,” Reliability Engineering & System Safety, vol. 117,
pp. 89–97, September 2013.

96
[50] R. Ghosh, D. S. Kim, and K. S. Trivedi, “System resiliency quantification using
non-state-space and state-space analytic models,” Reliability Engineering & System
Safety, vol. 116, pp. 109–125, September 2013.
[51] M. N. Albasrawi, N. Jarus, K. A. Joshi, and S. Sedigh Sarvestani, “Analysis of
reliability and resilience for smart grids,” in Proceedings of the 38th IEEE Computer
Software and Applications Conference, pp. 529–534, 2014.
[52] C. Nan and G. Sansavini, “A quantitative method for assessing resilience of interdependent infrastructures,” Reliability Engineering & System Safety, vol. 157, pp. 35 –
53, 2017.
[53] R. Filippini and A. Silva, “A modeling framework for the resilience analysis of
networked systems-of-systems based on functional dependencies,” Reliability Engineering & System Safety, vol. 125, pp. 82–91, 2014.
[54] R. J. Ellison, D. A. Fisher, R. C. Linger, H. F. Lipson, and T. Longstaff, “Survivable network systems: An emerging discipline,” tech. rep., DTIC Document, 1997.
Retrieved 2017-05-02.
[55] C. Queiroz, A. Mahmood, and Z. Tari, “A probabilistic model to predict the survivability of scada systems,” IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, vol. 9,
pp. 1975–1985, November 2013.
[56] R. Ball, The fundamentals of aircraft combat survivability analysis and design. No. v.
1 in AIAA education series, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics,
2003.
[57] National Communications System, Technology & Standards Division, “Telecommunications: Glossary of telecommunication terms - federal standard 1037C.”
http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037/fs-1037c.htm, 1996. Retrieved 2017-05-02.
[58] M. S. Deutsch and R. R. Willis, Software Quality Engineering: A Total Technical
and Management Approach. Software Engineering, Prentice Hall, 1988.
[59] A. Avritzer, L. Carnevali, L. Happe, B. R. Haverkort, A. Koziolek, D. Menasché,
A. Remke, and S. Sedigh Sarvestani, “Survivability evaluation of gas, water and
electricity infrastructures,” in Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on
Practical Applications of Stochastic Modelling (PASM), (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK),
May 2015.
[60] P. E. Heegaard and K. S. Trivedi, “Network survivability modeling,” Computer
Networks, vol. 53, no. 8, pp. 1215 – 1234, 2009.
[61] T1A1.2 Working Group, “Technical report on enhanced network survivability performance,” tech. rep., T1A1.2 Working Group on Network Survivability Performance,
February 2001.

97
[62] L. J. Zhang, W. Wang, L. Guo, Y. Wu, and Y. T. Yang, “A survivability quantitative
analysis model for network system based on attack graph,” in Proceedings of the IEEE
International Conference on Machine Learning and Cybernetics, vol. 6, pp. 3211–
3216, 2007.
[63] J. C. Knight, E. A. Strunk, and K. J. Sullivan, “Towards a rigorous definition of information system survivability,” in Proceedings of the DARPA Information Survivability
Conference and Exposition, vol. 1, pp. 78–89, 2003.
[64] Z. S. Ma, “A unified definition for reliability, survivability and resilience inspired
by the handicap principle and ecological stability,” International Journal of Critical
Infrastructures, vol. 8, no. 2-3, pp. 242–272, 2012.
[65] Y. Liu and K. S. Trivedi, “Survivability quantification: The analytical modeling
approach,” International Journal of Performability Engineering, vol. 2, no. 1, p. 29,
2006.
[66] L. Cloth and B. R. Haverkort, “Model checking for survivability!,” in Proceedings of
the 2nd IEEE International Conference on the Quantitative Evaluation of Systems,
pp. 145–154, 2005.
[67] A. Aziz, K. Sanwal, V. Singhal, and R. Brayton, “Model-checking continuous-time
Markov chains,” ACM Transactions on Computer Logic, vol. 1, pp. 162–170, July
2000.
[68] D. S. Kim, K. M. Shazzad, and J. S. Park, “A framework of survivability model for
wireless sensor network,” in Proceedings of the 1st IEEE International Conference
on Availability, Reliability and Security, pp. 8–12, 2006.
[69] J.-F. Castet and J. H. Saleh, “On the concept of survivability, with application
to spacecraft and space-based networks,” Reliability Engineering & System Safety,
vol. 99, pp. 123–138, 2012.
[70] J. P. Sterbenz, D. Hutchison, E. K. Çetinkaya, A. Jabbar, J. P. Rohrer, M. Schöller,
and P. Smith, “Resilience and survivability in communication networks: Strategies,
principles, and survey of disciplines,” Computer Networks, vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 1245–
1265, 2010.
[71] D. S. Menasché, R. M. Meri Leao, E. de Souza e Silva, A. Avritzer, S. Suresh,
K. Trivedi, R. A. Marie, L. Happe, and A. Koziolek, “Survivability analysis of
power distribution in smart grids with active and reactive power modeling,” ACM
SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, vol. 40, pp. 53–57, January 2012.
[72] A. Avritzer, S. Suresh, D. S. Menasché, R. M. M. Leao, E. de Souza e Silva,
M. C. Diniz, K. Trivedi, L. Happe, and A. Koziolek, “Survivability models for the
assessment of smart grid distribution automation network designs,” in Proceedings of
the 4th ACM/SPEC International Conference on Performance Engineering (ICPE),
(New York, NY, USA), pp. 241–252, 2013.

98
[73] A. Koziolek, A. Avritzer, S. Suresh, D. Sadoc Menasché, K. Trivedi, and L. Happe,
“Design of distribution automation networks using survivability modeling and power
flow equations,” in IEEE 24th International Symposium on Software Reliability
Engineering (ISSRE), pp. 41–50, November 2013.
[74] D. S. Menasché, A. Avritzer, S. Suresh, R. M. Leao, E. de Souza e Silva, M. Diniz, K. Trivedi, L. Happe, and A. Koziolek, “Assessing survivability of smart grid
distribution network designs accounting for multiple failures,” Concurrency and
Computation: Practice and Experience, vol. 26, no. 12, pp. 1949–1974, 2014.
[75] I. A. Alobaidi, S. Sedigh Sarvestani, and A. R. Hurson, “Survivability analysis and
recovery support for smart grids,” in Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium
on Resilient Cyber Systems, (Chicago, USA), August 2016.
[76] P. Chopade and M. Bikdash, “Modeling for survivability of smart power grid when
subject to severe emergencies and vulnerability,” in Proceedings of IEEE Southeastcon, pp. 1–6, March 2012.
[77] Z. Yi and T. Dohi, “A simulation approach to quantify network survivability on
MANETs,” in Proceedings of the 39th IEEE Computer Software and Applications
Conference (COMPSAC), vol. 3, pp. 268–273, July 2015.
[78] D. R. Cox and D. V. Hinkley, Theoretical statistics. CRC Press, 1979.
[79] University of Washington, “Power systems test case archive.” http://www.ee.
washington.edu/research/pstca/. Retrieved 2017-05-02.
[80] M. Asprou and E. Kyriakides, “Optimal PMU placement for improving hybrid state
estimator accuracy,” in IEEE Trondheim PowerTech, pp. 1–7, June 2011.
[81] N. Acharya and N. Mithulananthan, “Locating series FACTS devices for congestion
management in deregulated electricity markets,” Electric Power Systems Research,
vol. 77, pp. 352–360, March 2007.
[82] “EN 50160, voltage characteristics of electricity supplied by public distribution
systems,” tech. rep., CENELEC, 2005.
[83] Office of Electricity Delivery & Energy Reliability, Department of Energy, “Electric disturbance events (OE-417) annual summaries.” https://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/
OE417_annual_summary.aspx. Retrieved 2017-05-02.
[84] Y. Song and B. Wang, “Survey on reliability of power electronic systems,” IEEE
Transactions on Power Electronics, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 591–604, 2013.
[85] “PowerWorld
Corporation.”
http://www.powerworld.com/products/simulator/
overview. Retrieved 2017-05-02.
[86] “DIgSILENT GmbH.” http://www.digsilent.com/. Retrieved 2017-05-02.

99
[87] “MATPOWER, a MATLAB power system simulation package.” http://www.pserc.
cornell.edu/matpower/. Retrieved 2017-05-02.
[88] F. Milano, “An open source power system analysis toolbox,” IEEE Transactions on
Power Systems, vol. 20, pp. 1199–1206, August 2005.
[89] I. Solutions, “Delivering intelligent transport systems driving integration and innovation,” tech. rep., IBM Corperation, 2007.
[90] M. Amadeo, C. Campolo, and A. Molinaro, “Information-centric networking for connected vehicles: a survey and future perspectives,” IEEE Communications Magazine,
vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 98–104, 2016.
[91] K. N. Qureshi and A. H. Abdullah, “A survey on intelligent transportation systems,”
Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research, vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 629–642, 2013.
[92] I. Akyildiz, W. Su, Y. Sankarasubramaniam, and E. Cayirci, “A survey on sensor
networks,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 40, pp. 102–114, August 2002.
[93] A. R. Hurson and Y. Jiao, “Database system architecture–A walk through time:
From centralized platform to mobile computing,” in Advanced Distributed Systems,
pp. 1–9, Springer, 2005.
[94] P. Bonnet, J. Gehrke, and P. Seshadri, “Towards sensor database systems,” in Mobile
Data Management, pp. 3–14, Springer, 2001.
[95] N. Tsiftes and A. Dunkels, “A database in every sensor,” in Proceedings of the 9th
ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems, pp. 316–332, ACM,
2011.
[96] G. Dimitrakopoulos and P. Demestichas, “Intelligent transportation systems,” IEEE
Vehicular Technology Magazine, vol. 5, pp. 77–84, March 2010.
[97] L. Li, D. Wen, and D. Yao, “A survey of traffic control with vehicular communications,” IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, vol. 15, pp. 425–
432, February 2014.
[98] V. Milanes, J. Villagra, J. Godoy, J. Simo, J. Perez, and E. Onieva, “An intelligent V2Ibased traffic management system,” IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation
Systems, vol. 13, pp. 49–58, March 2012.
[99] S. Mitsch, S. Loos, and A. Platzer, “Towards formal verification of freeway traffic
control,” in Proceedings of the 3rd IEEE/ACM International Conference on CyberPhysical Systems, pp. 171–180, April 2012.
[100] M. Dotoli, M. Fanti, and G. Iacobellis, “A freeway traffic control model by first order
hybrid Petri nets,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Automation Science
and Engineering, pp. 425–431, August 2011.

100
[101] L. Zhen-Long, “A differential game modeling approach to dynamic traffic assignment
and traffic signal control,” in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on
Systems, Man and Cybernetics, vol. 1, pp. 849–855, October 2003.
[102] W. Qianjiao, L. Rong, and L. Xianglong, “An intelligent traffic control model based
on intersection agent,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Information
Engineering and Computer Science, pp. 1–5, December 2009.
[103] A. Tzes, S. Kim, and W. McShane, “Applications of Petri networks to transportation
network modeling,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 45, pp. 391–
400, May 1996.
[104] J. Julvez and R. Boel, “A continuous Petri net approach for model predictive control
of traffic systems,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A:
Systems and Humans, vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 686–697, 2010.
[105] H. Dezani, L. Gomes, F. Damiani, and N. Marranghello, “Controlling traffic jams on
urban roads modeled in coloured Petri net using genetic algorithm,” in Proceedings
of the 38th IEEE Conference on Industrial Electronics Society, pp. 3043–3048, 2012.
[106] J. Li and Q. Li, “Modeling of urban traffic system based on dynamic stochastic fluid
Petri net,” in Proceedings of the Workshop on Power Electronics and Intelligent
Transportation Systems, pp. 485–491, 2008.
[107] J. Wang, C. Jin, and Y. Deng, “Performance analysis of traffic networks based on
stochastic timed Petri net models,” in Proceedings of the 5th IEEE International
Conference on Engineering of Complex Computer System, pp. 77–85, 1999.
[108] M. E. Ben-Akiva, S. Gao, Z. Wei, and Y. Wen, “A dynamic traffic assignment model
for highly congested urban networks,” Transportation Research Part C: Emerging
Technologies, vol. 24, pp. 62–82, 2012.
[109] S. Lin, B. De Schutter, Y. Xi, and H. Hellendoorn, “An efficient model-based method
for coordinated control of urban traffic networks,” in Proceedings of the International
Conference on Networking, Sensing, and Control, pp. 8–13, April 2010.
[110] B. M. Williams and L. A. Hoel, “Modeling and forecasting vehicular traffic flow
as a seasonal ARIMA process: Theoretical basis and empirical results,” Journal of
Transportation Engineering, vol. 129, no. 6, pp. 664–672, 2003.
[111] Y. Wang, Z. Yang, and Q. Guan, “Traffic coordination and control model of regional
boundary based on fuzzy control,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on
Intelligent Computation Technology and Automation, vol. 1, pp. 946–950, October
2008.
[112] Y. Mo, T.-H. Kim, K. Brancik, D. Dickinson, H. Lee, A. Perrig, and B. Sinopoli,
“Cyber–physical security of a smart grid infrastructure,” Proceedings of the IEEE,
vol. 100, no. 1, pp. 195–209, 2012.

101
[113] C. C. Aggarwal, N. Ashish, and A. Sheth, “The Internet of things: A survey from
the data-centric perspective,” in Managing and Mining Sensor Data, pp. 383–428,
Springer, 2013.
[114] J. L. Cebula and L. R. Young, “A taxonomy of operational cyber security risks,” tech.
rep., Defense Technical Information Center Document, 2010.
[115] S. Rajasegarar, C. Leckie, and M. Palaniswami, “Anomaly detection in wireless
sensor networks,” IEEE Wireless Communications, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 34–40, 2008.
[116] S. Yin, G. Wang, and H. R. Karimi, “Data-driven design of robust fault detection
system for wind turbines,” Mechatronics, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 298–306, 2014.
[117] P. Freeman, P. Seiler, and G. J. Balas, “Air data system fault modeling and detection,”
Control Engineering Practice, vol. 21, no. 10, pp. 1290–1301, 2013.
[118] R. Jurdak, X. R. Wang, O. Obst, and P. Valencia, “Wireless sensor network anomalies: Diagnosis and detection strategies,” in Intelligence-Based Systems Engineering,
pp. 309–325, Springer, 2011.
[119] Y. Zhang, N. Meratnia, and P. Havinga, “Outlier detection techniques for wireless
sensor networks: A survey,” IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 12,
no. 2, pp. 159–170, 2010.
[120] V. Chandola, A. Banerjee, and V. Kumar, “Anomaly detection: A survey,” ACM
Computing Surveys, vol. 41, no. 3, p. 15, 2009.
[121] L. Fang and S. Dobson, “In-network sensor data modelling methods for fault detection,” in Evolving Ambient Intelligence, pp. 176–189, Springer, 2013.
[122] E.-H. Ngai, J. Liu, and M. Lyu, “On the intruder detection for sinkhole attack in
wireless sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on
Communications, vol. 8, pp. 3383–3389, June 2006.
[123] M. Panda and P. M. Khilar, “An efficient fault detection algorithm in wireless sensor
network,” in Contemporary Computing, pp. 279–288, Springer, 2011.
[124] L. Fang and S. Dobson, “Unifying sensor fault detection with energy conservation,”
in Self-Organizing Systems, pp. 176–181, Springer, 2014.
[125] S. Rajasegarar, C. Leckie, M. Palaniswami, and J. C. Bezdek, “Distributed anomaly
detection in wireless sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the 10th IEEE International
Conference on Communication systems, pp. 1–5, 2006.
[126] M. Chang, A. Terzis, and P. Bonnet, “Mote-based online anomaly detection using echo state networks,” in Distributed Computing in Sensor Systems, pp. 72–86,
Springer, 2009.

102
[127] O. Obst, “Distributed back propagation decorrelation learning,” in Proceedings of the
Neural Information Processing Systems Workshop: Large-Scale Machine Learning:
Parallelism and Massive Datasets, December 2009.
[128] C. Mayfield, J. Neville, and S. Prabhakar, “Eracer: a database approach for statistical
inference and data cleaning,” in Proceedings of the ACM International Conference
on Management of Data, pp. 75–86, ACM, 2010.
[129] X. R. Wang, J. T. Lizier, O. Obst, M. Prokopenko, and P. Wang, “Spatiotemporal
anomaly detection in gas monitoring sensor networks,” in Wireless Sensor Networks,
pp. 90–105, Springer, 2008.
[130] K. Ni and G. Pottie, “Sensor network data fault detection with maximum a posteriori
selection and Bayesian modeling,” ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks, vol. 8,
no. 3, p. 23, 2012.
[131] J. W. Branch, C. Giannella, B. Szymanski, R. Wolff, and H. Kargupta, “In-network
outlier detection in wireless sensor networks,” Knowledge and Information Systems,
vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 23–54, 2013.
[132] N. Chitradevi, V. Palanisamy, K. Baskaran, and U. B. Nisha, “Outlier aware data
aggregation in distributed wireless sensor network using robust principal component analysis,” in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computing
Communication and Networking Technologies, pp. 1–9, 2010.
[133] X. Ying-Xin, C. Xiang-Guang, and Z. Jun, “Data fault detection for wireless sensor
networks using multi-scale PCA method,” in Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Management Science and Electronic
Commerce, pp. 7035–7038, 2011.
[134] E. U. Warriach, T. A. Nguyen, M. Aiello, and K. Tei, “A hybrid fault detection
approach for context-aware wireless sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the 9th
IEEE International Conference on Mobile Adhoc and Sensor Systems, pp. 281–289,
2012.
[135] L.-A. Tang, X. Yu, S. Kim, Q. Gu, J. Han, A. Leung, and T. La Porta, “Trustworthiness
analysis of sensor data in cyber-physical systems,” Journal of Computer and System
Sciences, vol. 79, no. 3, pp. 383–401, 2013.
[136] H.-J. Liao, C.-H. Richard Lin, Y.-C. Lin, and K.-Y. Tung, “Intrusion detection system:
A comprehensive review,” Journal of Network and Computer Applications, vol. 36,
no. 1, pp. 16–24, 2013.
[137] C. Modi, D. Patel, B. Borisaniya, H. Patel, A. Patel, and M. Rajarajan, “A survey of intrusion detection techniques in cloud,” Journal of Network and Computer
Applications, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 42–57, 2013.

103
[138] L. Buttyán, D. Gessner, A. Hessler, and P. Langendoerfer, “Application of wireless
sensor networks in critical infrastructure protection: Challenges and design options,”
IEEE Wireless Communications, vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 44–49, 2010.
[139] R. Mitchell and I.-R. Chen, “A survey of intrusion detection techniques for cyberphysical systems,” ACM Computing Surveys, vol. 46, no. 4, p. 55, 2014.
[140] S. Gantayat, A. Misra, and B. Panda, “A study of incomplete data–a review,” in
Proceedings of the International Conference on Frontiers of Intelligent Computing:
Theory and Applications, pp. 401–408, Springer, 2014.
[141] M. Mezzanzanica, R. Boselli, M. Cesarini, and F. Mercorio, “A model-based approach for developing data cleansing solutions,” Journal of Data and Information
Quality, vol. 5, no. 4, 2015.
[142] T. Gschwandtner, W. Aigner, S. Miksch, J. Gärtner, S. Kriglstein, M. Pohl, and
N. Suchy, “Timecleanser: A visual analytics approach for data cleansing of timeoriented data,” in Proceedings of the 14th ACM International Conference on Knowledge Technologies and Data-driven Business, 2014.
[143] F. Ayatolahi, B. Sangchoolie, R. Johansson, and J. Karlsson, “A study of the impact of
single bit-flip and double bit-flip errors on program execution,” in Computer Safety,
Reliability, and Security, pp. 265–276, Springer, 2013.
[144] B. Sangchoolie, F. Ayatolahi, R. Johansson, and J. Karlsson, “A study of the impact of bit-flip errors on programs compiled with different optimization levels,” in
Proceedings of the 10th IEEE European Dependable Computing Conference, 2014.
[145] M. Beccuti, S. Chiaradonna, F. D. Giandomenico, S. Donatelli, G. Dondossola, and
G. Franceschinis, “Quantification of dependencies between electrical and information
infrastructures,” International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, vol. 5,
no. 1, pp. 14–27, 2012.
[146] C. Girault and R. Valk, Petri nets for System Engineering: A Guide to Modeling,
Verification, and Applications. Springer, 2001.
[147] M. K. Molloy, “Discrete time stochastic Petri nets,” IEEE Transactions on Software
Engineering, vol. SE-11, pp. 417–423, April 1985.
[148] S. R. Islam, K. M. Muttaqi, and D. Sutanto, “A decentralized multiagent-based
voltage control for catastrophic disturbances in a power system,” IEEE Transactions
on Industry Applications, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 1201–1214, 2015.
[149] F. Pommereau, “SNAKES: a flexible high-level Petri nets library,” in Proceedings of
Petri nets, vol. 9115 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 254–265, Springer,
2015.

104
VITA

Mark James Woodard was born in Walnut Creek, California. In May 2008, he
received a Bachelor’s of Science degree in Electrical and Computer Engineering from the
Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, Virginia. Upon graduation, Mark served as a
combat engineering officer in the US Army for four years. He began working toward his
Ph.D. in Computer Engineering at the Missouri University of Science and Technology in
August 2012 and received the degree in July 2017. During his time as a graduate student,
Mark taught digital network design, circuits analysis I, and multiple sections of the calculus
laboratory for engineers I and III. In addition to teaching and research, Mark completed a
summer internship at Sandia National Labs while working towards his doctoral degree.

